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ABSTRACT 
The last few decades have witnessed a dramatic increase in Democracy 
Assistance which has spurred a debate regarding the effectiveness of this type of aid in 
achieving Democratization in recipient countries especially in ―semi-authoritarian‖ 
settings. This thesis addresses Democracy Assistance provided to Egypt through USAID 
with a particular focus on civil society targeted programs. The main hypothesis of this 
thesis is that the failure of USAID civil society assistance to achieve Democratization, 
using the NGO Service Center Program as a case study, cannot be attributed alone to the 
nature of the political system in Egypt but that it may also be the result of (1) the narrow 
definition of civil society used by USAID namely equating it to non-governmental 
organizations mainly service NGOs while excluding HR NGOs which are critical of the 
Egyptian government and (2) the nature of the beneficiary Egyptian civil society 
organizations targeted by USAID. The findings in the context of this thesis provide 
substantial support to the arguments presented in the hypothesis. The USAID’s narrow 
definition of civil society has limited the effects of Democracy Assistance especially with 
the exclusion of advocacy or HR NGOs which are genuinely interested in promoting the 
democracy agenda. Furthermore, the nature of beneficiary Egyptian NGOs, which are 
plagued by a variety of problems from lack of internal democracy to low interest in 
constituency involvement in decision making, has also proved to be detrimental to the 
project’s ability to foster democratization.  Moreover, the lack of cooperation between the 
various Egyptian NGOs has also negatively affected their ability to influence decision 
makers.  
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CHAPTER ONE  
INTRODUCTION 
This thesis addresses Democracy Assistance provided to Egypt through USAID 
with a particular focus on civil society targeted programs. The NGO Service Center 
Program will be used as my main case study. This issue is of great importance due to the 
rising amount of aid allocated to this sector and the debate on the effectiveness of 
Democracy Aid in achieving Democratization in recipient countries especially in ―semi-
authoritarian‖ settings. The introductory chapter describes the research objectives and 
hypothesis, provides the outline of the thesis, and presents the research methodology used 
to achieve the thesis’ objectives. 
1.1. Research Objectives and Hypothesis 
The literature suggests that Democracy Assistance in general has failed to foster 
democratization in Egypt due to the restrictions imposed by the regime. This thesis 
examines the reasons underlying the failure of USAID Democracy Assistance to civil 
society in Egypt to foster democratization in general and to improve civil society 
performance in particular using the case of the NGO Service Center Program. My 
Hypothesis is that the failure of USAID Democracy Assistance Programs targeting civil 
society cannot be attributed alone to the nature of the political system in Egypt but that it 
may be also the result of (1) the narrow definition of civil society used by USAID namely 
equating it to non-governmental organizations mainly service NGOs while excluding HR 
NGOs which are critical of the Egyptian government and (2) the nature of the beneficiary 
Egyptian civil society organizations targeted by USAID.  
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1.2. Outline of the Thesis 
In order to achieve the research objectives, the thesis is organized as follows: 
Chapter 2 provides the background for the thesis research by discussing how 
Democratization theories have affected the evolution of Democracy Assistance, the 
approaches that direct Democracy Assistance, the focus on civil society, and an overview 
of existing studies evaluating the impact of Democracy Assistance. The definition of civil 
society has been an issue of great debate, a brief overview of this debate will be presented 
with a special focus on the relationship between civil society and democratization as it 
relates to the subject of the thesis. The literature on Democracy Assistance effectiveness 
presents contradicting findings; some positive and some negative. One of the most 
prolific writers on Democracy Assistance, Thomas Carothers, currently the vice president 
for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, has accumulated over two 
decades of qualitative research and case studies that show that Democracy Assistance can 
work in certain settings while in other cases, namely in authoritarian and semi-
authoritarian settings, it fails to achieve its objectives. Finkel, Perez-Linan and Seligson 
have conducted the most comprehensive quantitative studies on the effectiveness of 
Democracy Assistance in which they found that Democracy Assistance has a positive 
effect on Democratization, however, they remarked that the Middle East did not follow 
that pattern and were not able to explain this anomaly within the framework of their 
research. 
Chapter 3 provides a historical background on USAID in Egypt and the evolution 
of its projects as well as providing an overview of USAID projects in Egypt targeting the 
civil society sector with a focus on non governmental organizations. USAID projects in 
3 
 
 
 
support of civil society started in the first half of the 1980s, with the USAID 
Neighborhood Urban Services Project (1981-1985) that provided funding and technical 
assistance to both local government and NGO services in Cairo and Alexandria, this 
project was followed by the Local Development I and Local Development II projects 
starting the second half of the 1980s (1986-1992)  which expanded the activities started 
in the Neighborhood Urban Services Project to all Egyptian governorates. In 1992, The 
USAID started the PVO Development Project (1992-1999) which began with a focus on 
strengthening the organizational capacities of NGOs and stressed toward the end of the 
project on developing PVO capacities in governance and advocacy. The focus on 
governance and advocacy was at the core of the NGO Service Center project which 
concentrated on the promotion of civil society participation in public decision-making. 
Chapter 4 presents the case study of the NGO service center, a seven year USAID 
project, which aimed to increase the ability of civil society organizations to advocate and 
establish a permanent organization that can provide technical and material support to 
NGOs. The chapter provides background information on the legal setting under which the 
project started working and the evolution of laws governing NGO formation and 
activities during the project starting with Law 32 of 1964 up to Law 84 of 2002. The aim 
and operational scope of the project as well as the respective roles of USAID and the 
Egyptian Government on paper and in practice will be analyzed through the review of the 
original project documents, amendments made to these documents throughout the project 
and information collected through interviews with USAID officials and NGO Service 
Center personnel. An evaluation of the project impact on selected beneficiary NGOs 
working in advocacy will be conducted through the compilation of USAID evaluation 
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documents on the project as well as reviews from the literature in addition to information 
collected through interviews with USAID officials, NGO Service Center personnel, and 
Experts in Egyptian civil society.  
Chapter 5 draws a conclusion based on a synthesis of the information and findings 
shown in earlier chapters.   
 1.3. Methodology 
Due to the nature of the research objectives, which are exploratory, a qualitative 
research approach will be used. Both secondary data analysis and in-depth interviews will 
be conducted to achieve the research objectives and test the hypothesis. The secondary 
data analysis will provide a review of the literature on Democracy Assistance and USAID 
projects in Egypt in the sector of civil society as well as USAID project documents and 
evaluations. The in-depth interviews will be conducted mainly with USAID officials, 
NGO Service Center personnel, and Experts in Egyptian civil society to complement the 
secondary data available through the literature review.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE 
2.1. Democratization Theories and the Path of Democracy Assistance 
In order to understand the genesis of Democracy Assistance, it is important to 
look at how different theorists view the process of democratization since their views have 
affected how Democracy Assistance was channeled and the areas it focused on.  The road 
to democratization is a complex one in both reality and theory. Laurence Whitehead 
(2002, 27) defines democratization as ―a complex, long term dynamic and open ended 
process [consisting of] a progress towards a more rule-based, more consensual and more 
participatory type of politics‖.  A review of the literature reveals three main approaches 
seeking to explain the road to democratization: the Modernization, the Structural and the 
Transition approaches. The foundation of the Modernization approach was laid down in 
Seymour Martin Lipset works in 1960. Lipset used a number of economic indicators to 
link democracy to economic development or modernization. His main argument was that 
―the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy‖ 
(Potter 2005, 11). Even though the original study that Lipset conducted showed only a 
correlation between economic development and democracy, he tried to establish a causal 
relation between these two variables in subsequent work (Potter 2005). The 
Modernization approach implies that at a certain level of development or a specific 
―threshold‖, countries shift from being authoritarian to democratic and it also implies that 
even if democracy is attained in poorer settings it will not survive due to conflicts relating 
to distribution of wealth (Pzerwoski and Limongi 1997, 134). The Structural Approach, 
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similarly to the Modernization Theory, situates the democratization process outside the 
political sphere. Barrington Moore, who laid the foundation for this approach in his 1966 
work Social Origins of Dictatorships and democracy, proposes that democracy is a result 
of structural changes namely the change from agrarian to industrial societies. Moore 
argues that the rise of the bourgeoisie and their struggle with the landed classes was the 
decisive factor in establishing liberal democracy. Thus, capitalist development, as 
opposed to Lipset’s economic development in general, is seen by Moore as leading to 
democracy (Potter 2005, 19). The Modernization and Structural theories have affected 
the path of Democracy Assistance giving rise to what Carothers (2009, 5) calls the 
―developmental approach‖ to Democracy Assistance.  The ―developmental approach‖ 
adopted a ―broad‖ view of democratization as ―a slow, iterative process of change 
involving an interrelated set of political and socioeconomic developments‖ (Carothers 
2009, 5). Followers of the developmental approach, who believe that improved 
socioeconomic conditions leads to democratization focused on improving socioeconomic 
conditions, emphasized the value of cooperation with the recipient country and avoided 
activities that could lead to political clashes even which meant that even when engaging 
in democracy promotion they supported the use of subtle methods to assist democracy 
through focusing on human rights (Carothers 2009).  
Both the Modernization and Structural approaches have been criticized for 
downplaying the role of political actors in bringing about democratization and for 
focusing only on either the level of economic development or the evolution from agrarian 
to industrialist societies as the main source for achieving democratization (Pzerwoski and 
Limongi 1997). In an attempt to explain the process of democratization in terms of 
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―actions‖ and not ―conditions‖, Dankwart Rustow challenged Lipset’s approach and 
introduced an alternative theory in his article ―Transitions to Democracy‖ (Potter 2005, 
13).  Rustow saw democratization as the outcome of ―political bargaining‖ between 
―hardliners‖ and ―soft liners‖ rather than socioeconomic factors or conditions (Polidano 
2002, 261). In contrast to the Modernization Theory basic premise, Rustow also argued 
that poverty could actually lead to democracy (Polidano 2002). As opposed to Lipset who 
was interested in the factors that can lead to a ―stable‖ democracy, Rustow was more 
interested in how democracies can ―come into being‖, he proposed a ―route to 
democracy‖ that started with a country’s achieving ―national unity‖ followed by a 
―political struggle‖ that results in the adoption of democratic values by the elites only as a 
―compromise‖ and ending with a ―habituation‖ phase where democracy becomes 
embraced by the new elites instead of being a mere compromise (Potter 2005, 14). 
O’Donnell and Schmitter later work in 1986 Transitions from Authoritarian Rule built on 
Rustow’s Work and is considered the ―key reference‖ for the Transition theory; they 
divided the process of transition into three phases: Liberalization, Transition and 
Consolidation (Grugel 2002, 57). The Transition theory gave rise to what Carothers 
(2009, 5) calls the ―political approach‖ to Democracy Assistance. The ―political 
approach‖ adopted a ―narrow‖ view of democracy which perceived democratization as ―a 
process of political struggle in which democrats are trying to gain the upper hand‖ 
(Carothers 2009, 5). Followers of the ―political approach‖ directed Democracy 
Assistance to what is perceived by the donor country as democratic ―political actors‖ 
such as political parties and ―politically oriented‖ NGOs or to independent institutions 
that ―help to level the political playing field by securing and guaranteeing fair procedures 
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for the democratic actors and by checking the power of the nondemocratic actors‖ such as 
the judiciary or the media (Carothers 2009, 7). The ―political approach‖ followers are 
mainly concerned with creating a politically competitive and open environment which 
makes them focus on political advocacy (Carothers 2009). Based on the belief in the 
Transition Approach sequence starting with liberalization and ending with consolidation, 
donors directed Democracy Assistance in authoritarian settings to create an ―opening‖ 
through empowering civil society and the media till the perceived ―breakthrough‖ takes 
place, they shifted their focus to elections, and finally they turned to ―consolidation‖ 
efforts focusing on the legislature and judiciary (Finkel, Perez-Linan and Seligson 2007, 
410-411). However, the basic premise of the Transition Approach, that countries trying to 
steer away from dictatorships are essentially on the road to democracy, has been 
discredited by the rising number of countries that did not follow the predicted sequence in 
addition to those countries which have managed to achieve democratization without 
going through the transitional sequence (Carothers 2002). The Transition Approach was 
also heavily criticized for its neglect of ―underlying conditions and structures for 
democratic success‖ (Carothers 2002, 24). 
With the rising criticism of the Transition Approach, revamped versions of the 
Modernization and Structural theories started to resurface to provide plausible 
explanations for the failure of consolidation. Both the Modernization and Structural 
theories have been revisited a number of times by other theorists. With respect to the 
Modernization theory, Pzerwoski and Limongi (1997) suggested that while causality is 
not well established between the level of economic development and the incidence 
democracy, it is still evident that democracy survives better in wealthy nations. They 
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concluded in their research that democracy is not a ―by-product‖ of economic 
development and that it could be established by political actors at any level development, 
however, it can only survive in ―growing‖ economies (Pzerwoski and Limongi 1997, 
177). Diamond also added other elements to the Modernization theory namely political 
culture and civil society which he considered instrumental in the survival or consolidation 
of democracy (G, 50). The Structural Approach was also revisited by a number of other 
theorists such as Dietrich Rueschemeyer and his colleagues who viewed the rise of a 
working class and not the bourgeoisie as the instrumental structural change that can bring 
about democratization (Shapiro, 80).  Carothers (2002, 24) suggested an amalgamation of 
both suitable ―conditions‖ and ―structures‖ for successful democratization; he listed 
several ―core facilitators‖ that can help to promote democracy namely the stage of 
economic development of the country in question, the level of centralization of its 
resources, the homogeneity of its society, and the level of democratization of the region 
surrounding it. Carothers (2002) argued that the more a country is economically 
developed, the more decentralized its resources are, the more homogeneous its population 
is, and the more democratic the region is, the easier it is for a country to achieve 
democratization.  
Carothers (2009) argues that even though some have tried to identify the 
American Democracy Assistance with the ―political approach‖ while identifying the 
European Democracy Assistance with the ―developmental approach‖, this is not the case. 
He cautions against the belief of the existence of a unified American or a unified 
European approach to aiding democratization especially taking into account the existence 
of a number of players and variety of interests on both sides. Carothers critiqued Richard 
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Youngs’ identification of European Democracy Aid as purely developmental. Youngs, 
who makes the distinction between ―Democracy as a Product vs. Democracy as a 
Process‖, argues that Europeans generally see democracy as a process whereby political 
reform is seen ―as a part of a general process of social and economic modernization‖ (as 
cited in Carothers 2009, 16).  However, Carothers argues that even though the 
developmental approach is relatively emphasized in European Democracy Assistance, it 
still draws on the political approach in certain instances. He attributes Europe’s interest in 
the developmental approach to both its commitment to further the development in 
recipient countries ―for development’s sake‖ as opposed to having a security agenda that 
they are trying to promote, and European ―pessimism‖ with respect to democracy in 
unfavorable economic circumstances due to the ―violent mutations and reversals of 
democracy‖ they witnessed with fascism (Carothers 2009, 17). Carothers (2009) contends 
that the data on US Democracy Assistance shows equal amount of funding drawing on 
both the political and developmental approach. He argues that the U.S. Agency for 
International Development (USAID) Democracy Assistance projects generally draw on 
the developmental approach while the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and 
the Department of State usually adhere to the political approach. He also points out to the 
fact that USAID substantially large amounts of assistance is overshadowed by the highly 
noticeable politically oriented assistance provided by other US actors. Carothers (2009) 
puts forward the proposition that the two approaches should be studied further to 
understand their use and effectiveness in different settings especially in semi-
authoritarian regimes which have perfected the ability of projecting an image of 
democracy while actually making it devoid of essence.  
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2.2 The “Take-off” of Democracy Assistance 
Democracy Promotion has gradually become an accepted foreign policy objective 
over the last two decades. Michael McFaul (2004, 153) argues that this newfound 
―legitimacy‖ can be attributed to the ―erosion of the state sovereignty norm‖ which has 
been brought about by the efforts of the international community to establish norms to 
safeguard human rights. International treaties and laws became increasingly far reaching 
to the extent that it gave external actors the ―right‖ and the ―responsibility‖ to protect 
human rights (McFaul 2004, 155). External actors became involved in Democracy 
Promotion as the idea of the Right to Democracy became incorporated into the issue of 
Human Rights. Many tools were used by different external actors in their quest to 
promote democracy in other countries, ranging from providing Democracy Assistance, 
offering multilateral institutions’ membership, conditioning aid or imposing sanctions, to 
the more controversial military interventions. Democracy Assistance, one of the most 
used tools of Democracy Promotion, is defined as ―aid programs specifically designed 
either to help nondemocratic countries become democratic or to help countries that have 
initiated democratic transitions consolidate their democratic system‖ (Carothers and 
Ottoway 2000a, 4-5). Peter Burnell (2000) identified three criteria that distinguish 
Democracy Assistance programs. The first criteria being that the main goal of the 
assistance should be to promote Democracy. The second criteria relates to the method by 
which the assistance is made namely that it’s done in a ―peaceful way‖ and that it 
involves ―transfer of resources of one sort or another‖ (Burnell 2000, 5).  The third being 
the concessionary nature of the Assistance which means that it is provided in the form of 
a grant. Burnell attributes the ―take-off‖ of Democracy Assistance in the 90s to a number 
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of ―push‖ and ―pull‖ factors. The ―push‖ factors were the end of the Cold War and 
subsequent fall of the communist model which made it both ―safe‖ and ―smart‖ for 
western governments to promote the liberalized democratic model as well as the fact that 
Democracy Assistance gave donors the opportunity to revamp the tarnished image of aid 
after years of supporting dictators. While the ―pull‖ factors were the rising demand for 
reform in many countries especially in central and eastern Europe in addition to a number 
of African countries as well as the change in perception regarding the relationship 
between economic and political development with the rise of theories questioning the 
idea that economic development is a ―requisite‖ to a stable democracy and the rise of the 
idea that political reform improves the potential benefits of development aid and 
economic performance (Burnell 2000, 39).  
Carothers (1999) sums up the types of Democracy Assistance into four categories; 
(1) aid provided to state institutions, (2) political parties, (3) aid for the design and 
implementation of elections and (4) aid provided to civil society. Aid provided to state 
institutions started in the 60s, it covered aid provided to draft a new constitution or amend 
an existing one, aid to improve relationship between the military and society, aid to 
strengthen legislatures, judiciaries and local government. Democracy Assistance in this 
category excluded the executive branch as a result of donors’ perception of it as ―overly 
strong‖; therefore, they feel the need to strengthen other state institutions to 
―counterbalance‖ the effect of the executive branch (Carothers 1999, 159). Most aid to 
state institutions targeted the judiciary; it started in the 60s with programs targeting legal 
education and lawyers and developed in the mid 80s an emphasis on reforming criminal 
law systems with the aim of safeguarding human rights. ―Law-oriented aid‖ or ―Rule of 
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Law Assistance‖ became an integral part of the assistance provided to the judiciary sector 
in the 90s, it covered a variety of areas from efforts to update and rewrite civil and 
criminal laws, the introduction of new commercial laws, to strengthening the institutions 
and associations working in the legal sector among other areas (Carothers 1999, 164). 
The second type of Democracy Assistance which is provided to political parties is 
the most controversial type of aid due to its association with ―political interventionism‖ 
raising the question ―whether it is legitimate for an outside actor to seek to shape the 
internal political life of another country‖ (Carothers 1999, 144).  Official aid provided to 
political parties started modestly in the 80s and expanded in the 90s, however, it was 
mainly dominated by West European actors specially Germany. Most of the aid provided 
to political parties came in association with electoral aid to strengthen the political 
parties’ capability to run for elections, still, a part of aid was also provided in between 
elections to foster the organizational development of political parties in the long term. 
This type of aid provided training for political parties on many aspects such as choice of 
candidates to run for elections, fundraising, mobilization of voters, and training of 
volunteers.  
Carothers traces the origin of electoral aid to the mid 80s with aid provided to 
Central America. Electoral aid targeted five areas. The first provided help in the ―design 
of electoral systems‖ in recipient countries which included deciding on the number of 
rounds for the election, the size of the legislative districts and the registration of political 
parties (Carothers 1999, 125). The second ensured the ―good administration‖ of elections 
by crafting regulations that control campaign spending for political parties, how ballots 
are distributed and collected, and how voter registration is checked(Carothers 1999, 125). 
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The third area focused on ―voter education‖ in terms of knowledge of voting procedures 
and the importance of their vote in the context of democratic elections (Carothers 1999, 
126). The two remaining areas, ―election observing‖ and ―election mediation‖, were 
connected to some extent, the first ensured that elections were ―free‖ and ―fair‖ while the 
second tried to make the losing party abide by the results of the election (Carothers 1999, 
128).     
Civil society, a term that has been reintroduced in the 90s and has since grown in 
appeal, has become the target of many donors who view it as a ―bottom up‖ approach to 
democratization (Carothers 1999, 207). Even though, in theory civil society comprised of 
many sectors, in practice donors mostly identified civil society with non governmental 
organizations. Although the focus of aid provided to non-governmental organizations in 
the 70s was on improving socioeconomic conditions rather than promoting democracy, 
this trend shifted in the 90s with the launch of ―Civil Society Assistance‖ as part of 
Democracy Aid, the focus became on prodemocracy and advocacy groups (Carothers 
1999, 210). Donors provided two types of assistance to civil society Organizations: 
training mainly focusing on advocacy skills and financial support for the purchase of 
equipment and materials needed by these organizations.   
2.3. The “Rise” of Civil Society Assistance 
The rising amounts of foreign assistance provided to civil society in recent years 
brought about a heated debate about the definition of civil society and its effect on 
democratization. From a historical perspective, the term "civil society" seems to have 
been equally used by different schools of political theorists, however, the concept has 
acquired different meanings and attributes according to its proponents. Political theorists 
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and political economists differed in their conception of civil society as a connected or 
separate entity from the state and whether this entity actually encompasses the market or 
is different from it (Abdelrahman, 2004). When the term "civil society" was first used in 
the work of ancient Greek philosophers, it was in connection with the state. In the late 
18th century, a number of political thinkers starting with Thomas Paine to George Hegel 
developed the concept of civil society to refer to an independent sector from the state 
where citizens come together and form groups based on their shared interests (Carothers, 
1999-2000). While Liberal theorists saw the nature of civil society as harmonious, 
Leftists saw it as essentially of a conflicting nature in need of regulation and differed on 
the entity responsible for providing this regulation whether it is the state or members of 
civil society itself (Abdelrahman, 2004). In contemporary political thought, even though 
there seems to be an agreement that civil society is one of the elements of society besides 
the market and the state, there is a lack of consensus on the type of organizations that it 
encompasses and whether it is separate from political society, i.e. political parties and 
other entities that are in pursuit of state control (Carothers and Ottoway, 2002). Amy 
Hawthorne (2005, 82) defines civil society as ―the zone of voluntary associative life 
beyond family and clan affiliations but separate from the state and the market‖ which 
includes ―nonprofit organizations, religious organizations, labor unions, business 
associations, interest and advocacy groups, societies, clubs, and research institutions, as 
well as more informal political, social, and religious movements‖ while it does not 
include political parties. Schmitter agrees with Hawthorne’s view that civil society is 
characterized by ―non-usurpation‖ i.e. that it does not seek power (whitehead 1999, 73). 
Amany Kandil (2006), Egyptian civil society expert, also believes in the exclusion of 
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political parties from civil society since they mainly seek power and that once their target 
is achieved, these parties may monopolize decision making thus contradicting the essence 
of civil society. I believe that the exclusion of political parties and all other entities which 
are seeking power from civil society is justifiable since many of the functions performed 
by civil society require an objective view of political institutions and their performance 
which is not achievable in the case of those seeking control over the state. Carothers 
(1999-2000), on the other hand, argues that the definition of civil society is wider and 
that it includes all entities outside the state which means it includes political parties. He 
contends that Donors, however, seem to equate civil society to Non-Governmental 
Organizations. Furthermore, Carothers and Ottoway (2000a) make the point that even 
though donors have provided funding to NGOs that aim at alleviating socioeconomic 
hardship, the view that donors have of civil society, as essentially associations that aim at 
fostering democracy and ensuring state accountability, made them direct most of their 
funding to advocacy groups and NGOs working in areas related to democratization such 
as election monitoring and political and civil rights.  
Carothers (1999, 222) argues that the link between civil society and 
democratization was based on Tocqueville’s1 view of civil society as a platform for 
―civic participation‖ that gradually leads the government to become more democratic as 
well as more ―responsive‖ to the demands of citizens. According to Diamond (1999), 
civil society plays an important role in democratization by performing a number of roles. 
At the most fundamental level, civil society plays a ―checking and limiting‖ role in terms 
of holding the political institutions accountable and monitoring their performance 
                                                 
1
 Alexis de Tocqueville, a French thinker and political writer, wrote in his book Democracy in America 
(1835) about the role of civil society in establishing Democracy in America.  
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(Diamond 1999, 241).Civil society also plays an educational role in spreading the values 
of ―democratic political culture‖ by raising the people’s awareness of their political rights 
and encouraging political participation (Diamond 1999, 242). Additionally, civil society 
functions as an intermediary or a link between the society and the state and helps in the 
articulation and representation of interests of the various segments of society ensuring 
that none of these segments is marginalized (Diamond 1999, 243). However, in order for 
civil society to fulfill its role, certain conditions need to be met. Mustapha Al-Sayyid 
(1995, 271) identifies three pre-requisites for the development of a viable civil society: 
the existence of a variety of  civil society organizations that represent the different social 
classes and groups, the presence of a ―spirit of tolerance‖ of minority rights, and an end 
to the ―arbitrary‖ nature of state control. Amany Kandil (2008) points to the importance 
of constituency support and good internal governance practices for civil society’s ability 
to play an active role on the political scene. Kandil (2006) also highlights the importance 
of cooperation between the different Civil Society Organizations in increasing their 
ability to influence decision makers. While I believe in the ability of civil society to play 
an important role in democratization, as set forward by Diamond (1999), I think that, as 
outlined in my hypothesis, in the Egyptian setting civil society has been hampered by a 
variety of internal problems besides the state’s aggressive policies towards it. 
Furthermore, I believe that the segment of civil society that can really perform all the 
functions stated by Diamond (1999) is advocacy or HR NGOs, especially those critical of 
the Egyptian government, which have been excluded from being beneficiaries of the 
NGO Service Center project which required the Egyptian government’s approval of 
grantees.  
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Carothers and Ottoway (2000a) argue that the heightened interest in civil society 
is in fact the result of the role civil society played in the fall of the Berlin Wall and 
donors’ perception of civil society organizations as essentially having a ―non partisan‖ 
nature giving donors the opportunity to seek their objective of democracy promotion 
without ―explicitly playing politics‖ (Carothers and Ottoway 2000a, 12). Carothers and 
Ottoway (2000a) also credit the failure of other types of Democracy Assistance programs 
to produce democratization for donors’ heightened interest in civil society aid. Carothers 
and Ottoway (2000a) point to the fact that Democracy Assistance which focuses on the 
state incurs high cost and generate in most instances high level of opposition from the top 
echelons of state institutions who are not eager to reform because they have vested 
interest in the status quo. Thus civil society aid which requires substantially less funding 
proved a more appealing alternative to donors. However, Michael Edwards and David 
Hulme (1998, 9-10) point to the lack of ―empirical‖ evidence to show that ―NGO 
provision is cheaper than public provision‖ or that it is better ―value for money‖ in 
addition to the fact that NGOs may direct funding to areas that are not a priority for 
national development because they have ―weak central oversight‖.  Carothers (1999-
2000) questioned whether in reality a strong civil society can lead to democratization, as 
he pointed to the rise of Hitler in Germany even though Germany’s civil society was 
quite active in the 20s and 30s.  
With the growth of civil society Assistance and its inability to foster 
democratization in many instances especially in the Arab World, different justifications 
started to surface to account for this failure including the belief that the ―bottom up 
approach‖ was inadequate in authoritarian settings, the idea that assistance for civil 
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society Organizations’ had negative effects on their performance, their legitimacy and 
accountability which limited their capacity to promote democracy, and the notion that the 
design and implementation of Assistance programs were flawed which limited their 
impact on democratization. Hawthorne (2005, 92) argues that the two trademarks of 
authoritarian regimes mainly ―state repression‖ and the ―political apathy‖ of citizens have 
contributed to the failure of civil society Assistance to bring about democratization in 
addition to the fact that in many authoritarian settings civil society Organizations may be 
controlled by ―apolitical, pro-government, or even illiberal‖ leaders who are not 
interested in seeking democracy. Michael Edwards and David Hulme (1998, 6) claim that 
―dependence‖ on assistance could ―compromise performance in key areas, distort 
accountability, and weaken legitimacy‖. They argue that increased foreign assistance may 
lead to the ―bureaucratization‖ of NGOs to meet donors’ requirements and thus affect 
their performance by reducing their flexibility and ability to innovate (Edwards and 
Hulme 1998, 11). They also argue that foreign assistance to NGOs compromises their 
ability with regards to advocacy by making them vulnerable to state attacks on their 
credibility and its portrayal of them as pawns in the hands of external players. With 
respect to legitimacy, Edwards and Hulme question the ability of NGOs to have their 
own agendas while being dependent on foreign assistance.  With regard to accountability, 
Edwards and Hulme (1998, 17) contend that foreign assistance ―may reorient 
accountability upwards‖ with NGOs being more accountable to donors and less 
accountable to grassroots and internal constituencies which may result in making NGOs 
concentrate on areas that donors would be more willing to fund while neglecting other 
areas that are more important for their constituents.  
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Hawthorne (2005, 102) criticized the donors’ design and implementation of civil 
society assistance projects. She questioned the donors’ focus on service non 
governmental organizations and prodemocracy groups which have the ―shallowest roots‖ 
in the society which were in reality unable to mobilize citizens or even create alliances 
with other non governmental organizations or other sectors of the civil society. 
Furthermore, Hawthorne (2005) argues that donors ignored the issue of lack of autonomy  
faced by non governmental due to the legal restrictions imposed on them by authoritarian 
regimes and that even in many instances donors  allowed governments to take part in the 
decision making process for funding beneficiary NGOs which actually enabled the state 
to hamper non governmental organizations further.  
2.4. Evaluation of Democracy Assistance  
Imco Brouwer (2000, 42) identifies three levels on which the impact of 
Democracy Assistance programs should be assessed; the ―Micro‖ level which refers to 
the impact on individuals and specific organizations, the ―Meso‖ level which refers to the 
development  of an ―active‖ civil society, and the ―Macro‖ level which refers to the 
impact on the political regime.  Brouwer argues that at the Micro level, most projects 
have a positive impact whether in terms of sustaining current civil society Organizations 
or creating new organizations in addition to increasing the targeted civil society 
Organizations efficiency, transparency, and accountability as well as increasing the skill 
level of their staff. At the Meso level, Brouwer (2000, 43) points to the fallacy of 
confusing the growth in civil society Organizations numbers with the presence of an 
―active‖ civil society and calls for assessment on the basis of the effect that civil society 
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Organizations have on the policy making process of the government as well as 
conducting public opinion polls measuring the ―civic mindedness of citizens‖.  
At the Macro level, Brouwer questions the seriousness of the objectives set by 
donors in public in terms of regime change, while in private most of these donors would 
be content to achieve less drastic unpublicized goals such as maintaining stability in a 
specific geographical area or collecting socioeconomic and political information that is 
normally inaccessible to them. He also points out the fact that when assessing the impact 
of Democracy Assistance in Egypt, Democracy Assistance does not seem to have a 
positive impact, he argues that the environment in which civil society Organizations 
operated in 2000 is actually more restrictive that that 15 years ago as a result of the 
highly restrictive laws imposed by the Egyptian government in recent years.  
Most studies conducted at the Micro level, looking at the effect of specific 
projects on individuals and organizations, are conducted by donor agencies. Carothers 
(1999) questions the objectivity of these studies, which are usually focused on the 
projects’ overall performance and conducted during and shortly after the end of 
assistance projects, since most of the information collected for these evaluations usually 
comes from project officers and a number of interviewees from beneficiary civil society 
Organizations who are also selected by the project officers which means that all 
interviewees are direct beneficiaries of the aid projects whether by being project 
personnel with a stake in project success or aid recipients afraid of assistance being cut if 
negative information is reported. Carothers calls for a more balanced information 
collection approach that combines information collected from project officers, 
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beneficiary civil society Organizations and other stakeholders who have no vested 
interest in the aid project and are knowledgeable about the sector the project is serving.  
At the Meso and Macro levels, looking at the effect of specific projects on the 
development of an active civil society and on the political regime as a whole, a number of 
qualitative and quantitative studies have been conducted by donor agencies and scholars 
in the field of democracy promotion.  Two challenges face studies evaluating Democracy 
Assistance Programs: the difficulty of identifying success criteria and that of proving a 
causal relationship between Democracy Assistance programs and changes in the recipient 
countries (Carothers, 1999). Carothers contends that due to differences in political 
cultures there are no agreed upon ―objective‖ criteria to be used in measuring the success 
of Democracy Assistance programs (Carothers 1999, 283). As for establishing causal 
relationships, he points out that any Democracy Assistance Program represents one 
element in the bigger picture that incorporates a multitude of other elements whether in 
terms of other programs being implemented at the same time or other direct and indirect 
influences, thus, the ―causal link‖ built into aid programs, that lets aid workers attribute 
positive changes in their work field to their efforts whether a ―plausible link‖ exists or 
not, is highly questionable (Carothers 1999, 295). Both Brouwer (2000) and Carothers 
(1999) point to the problems underlying the use of quantifiable indicators, without 
supporting it with qualitative information and analysis, as a measure of movement 
towards democratization since quantifiable indicators capture only part of the bigger 
picture and therefore can be misleading as in the case of voter registration going up while 
the voting system is fraudulent.  
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The most extensive scholarly work in the field of qualitative evaluation of 
Democracy Assistance, with a focus on USAID efforts in this sector for more than a 
decade, is that by Thomas Carothers who also collaborated with others including Marina 
Ottoway to produce several books and a multitude of articles to analyze the effect of 
Democracy Assistance on democratization and the development of civil society in a 
variety of geographical locations and settings.
2
 Richard Youngs, currently a senior 
research fellow and coordinator of the Democratization Program at FRIDE
3
, is also one 
of the most prolific writers who contributed to the literature on Democracy Assistance 
with a focus on European Aid.
4
 In the Egyptian context, Maha Abdel Rahman
5
 and 
Amany Kandil
6
 have both provided a number of invaluable studies focusing on Egyptian 
civil society organizations, their nature and the effect of foreign aid in general on some of 
these organizations.  
As for quantitative studies, the most comprehensive studies to date, in terms of 
number of countries covered as well as number of years, were conducted by Finkel, 
Perez-Linan and Seligson (2006 and 2008) and focused on the effect of USAID 
                                                 
2
 The books authored and/or edited by Thomas Carothers include: Uncharted Journey: Promoting 
Democracy in the Middle East, co-edited with Marina Ottaway (Carnegie, 2005); Critical Mission: Essays 
on Democracy Promotion (Carnegie, 2004); Funding Virtue: civil society Aid and Democracy Promotion, 
co-edited with Marina Ottaway (Carnegie, 2000); Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve 
(Carnegie, 1999).  
3
 FRIDE is a think tank based in Madrid that aims to provide insights into Europe’s role in the international 
arena with a focus on peace and security, human rights, democracy promotion, and development and 
humanitarian aid. For further information please refer to http://www.fride.org/page/5/about-fride. 
4
 The books authored by Richard Youngs include: Europe and the Middle East: In the Shadow of 
September 11 (Lynne Reinner, 2006), International Democracy and the West: The Role of Governments, 
civil society and Multinationals (Oxford University Press, 2004), and The European Union and the 
Promotion of Democracy (Oxford University Press, 2002). 
5
 Maha Abdel Rahman is an Egyptian sociologist. Among her recent publications is the book entitled ―Civil 
Society Exposed: The Politics of NGOs in Egypt‖ (Taurus Academic Studies, 2004). 
6
 Amani Kandil is the executive director of the Arab Network for NGOs in Cairo. She is also a political 
writer and has written extensively on Egyptian civil society. She has authored a book entitled ―Al-Mujtama 
Al-Madanī wa-al-Dawlah fī Miṣr‖ or Civil Society and the State in Egypt (al-Maḥrūsah, 2006). She has 
also collaborated on the UN Human Development Report in 2008.  
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Democracy and Governance Assistance on democratization. In their review of previous 
studies, Finkel, Perez-Linan and Seligson (2006) conclude that both qualitative and 
quantitative studies done in that field seem to reach different conclusions. They contend 
that early qualitative studies were more concerned about the motivations behind 
Democracy Assistance than its effects on democratization and that most qualitative 
studies reach negative conclusions about the effect of aid on democratization with the 
noted exception of the work of Carothers who has pointed to the positive effect of 
USAID on democratization in some instances even though  he still raises the issue of the 
limitations posed the national security interest s on the democracy promotion agenda of 
the US as well as the inadequacy of following the same approach in all settings which 
end up compromising the effect of assistance on democratization.  
As for prior quantitative studies, Finkel, Perez-Linan and Seligson (2006) point 
out that previous studies generally correlate overall assistance with democratization 
instead of looking specifically at Democracy Assistance and therefore end up arriving at 
contradicting conclusions. They point to the Goldsmith study in 2001, which focused on 
Sub-Saharan Africa and reached the conclusion that aid has a positive effect on 
democracy as opposed to Knack’s study in 2004, which looked at a larger number of 
countries, found that aid has no effect on democratization. They also point to the study by 
Paxton and Morishima in 2005, the first to focus on Democracy Assistance as opposed to 
overall assistance, which found that Democracy Assistance has positive effects on 
democratization.  
In their first study (2006), Finkel, Perez-Linan and Seligson collected information 
on Democracy and Governance Assistance provided by USAID to 165 countries between 
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1990 and 2003. They have tried to measure the impact of the assistance provided on 
democratization of the recipient countries using the Freedom House index
7
 which 
measures the level of political rights and civil liberties, and the Polity IV index
8
 which 
gives a typology of regimes from ―extremely autocratic‖ to ―highly democratic‖. They 
also developed more specific indicators to measure the performance of each of the 
targeted subsectors; civil society, Human Rights, and Free media among others. They 
concluded that ―USAID democracy and governance obligations have a significant 
positive impact on democracy‖ (Finkel, Perez-Linan and Seligson 2006, 83). However, 
the study showed that in certain subsectors, namely Governance and Human Rights this 
positive effect did not materialize. The Human Rights sector even showed a negative 
effect, which they argued could be due to the increased efficiency Human Rights 
Associations in reporting abuses rather than an increase in Human Rights abuse. Another 
important finding, which proved controversial and whose reasons were not addressed by 
the study, is that the Middle East was an exception to the ―general pattern‖ of the effect 
of Democracy Assistance on democratization (Finkel, Perez-Linan and Seligson 2006, 
87). 
In the second study, which covered from 1990 to 2005, Finkel, Perez-Linan and 
Seligson (2008) tried to use the ―political culture‖ of the recipient countries to explain the 
differences in the effect of Democracy Assistance. However, they ended up concluding 
                                                 
7
 Freedom House Index, developed by the American NGO freedom House, is a 7 point scale ranging from 
1 being the ideal to 7 being the worst in terms of civil and political liberties. However, Finkel, Perez-Linan 
and Seligson amended the index and made it a 13 point scale (1 to13) for the purpose of their study.  For 
more information about Freedom House Index rating and its methodology please refer to: 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=35&year=2005 
8
 Polity IV index, developed by the Center for Systemic Peace and George Mason University, is a 21 point 
scale ranging from -10 being fully institutionalized autocracy to +10 being fully consolidated democracy. 
For more information about Polity IV index please refer to: 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm 
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that even though political culture factors especially high level of trust between citizens, 
increase in political engagement, and low level of nationalistic political orientation seem 
to improve the positive effects Democracy Assistance, the study could not explain the 
negative effects witnessed on the Human Rights subsector.   
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CHAPTER THREE 
USAID DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS IN EGYPT 
3.1. Background of USAID in Egypt 
The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) was 
established in 1961 by President J. F. Kennedy in response to the congress’ request for 
the creation of a specialized agency to implement economic assistance programs. 
Assistance was perceived as a useful foreign policy ―tool‖ to promote US national 
security interests (About USAID: USAID History 2009). Globally, the main objective at 
the start of aid in the 60s was warding ―soviet influence‖ through the provision of aid to 
―friendly governments‖ (Carothers 1999, 19). Promoting development, another theme 
introduced during the Kennedy administration in the 60s, was also used as an indirect 
tool to counterbalance soviet influence based on the ideas set forward by the 
―Modernization Theory‖, which assumes the existence of a ―linear model‖ of 
development where economic development leads to democracy (Carothers 1999, 20-21). 
Thus, promoting development was essentially perceived as an indirect way leading to 
democracy even though this notion was not put forward in aid policy formulation.  
With the end of the 60s and the failure of the indirect approach mainly employed 
in Latin America to put an end to communist influence or to promote democracy, the 
Nixon administration adopted a ―realist approach‖ which focused on the provision of 
―basic human needs to third world citizens‖ (Carothers 1999, 28).  The human rights 
theme rose to new heights under the Carter administration following the Vietnam War, 
however, the Carter administration mainly used diplomatic measures such as cutting aid 
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or imposing sanctions rather than providing democracy assistance (Carothers 1999). The 
rise of democracy promotion came about during the Reagan Administration in the early 
80s which witnessed the creation of a private non-profit organization financed by the US 
government called the National Endowment for Democracy (NED). The NED started by 
providing grants to anti-communist organizations, but this trend decreased with the end 
of the Cold War, Eventually, the US adopted a more direct approach to democracy 
promotion using two main tools: assisting elections and strengthening the administration 
of justice. These tools were employed in Latin America and to a lesser degree in Asia, 
however, this focus on democracy promotion did not permeate to the Middle East. In the 
early 90s, after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, 
democracy promotion expanded into Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, and 
started to appear on the agenda for the Middle East as well (Carothers 1999).  
Democracy promotion was presented as a priority objective after September 11 as 
illustrated in a 2005 USAID policy report stating: ―Democracy is central to our national 
security. Today, the primary threat to our security no longer comes from well-organized 
states with potent military forces, but from terror networks—some aided by outlaw 
regimes—operating in failed states or weakly governed regions. Countries that lack 
political freedom, accountability, and avenues for redress can also breed internal 
instability and threaten regional and international security. Good governance founded on 
democratic principles is the best hope for facing those threats‖ (At Freedom’s Frontiers 
2005, 7). Thus, in the new millennium, assistance became a tool for the fight against 
terrorism and democracy promotion was the means towards this end as it has been used 
before as a tool to counterbalance soviet influence in the 60s and till the end of the Cold 
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War. However, it is important to note, as Fukuyama and McFaul (2007, 29-30) argue, 
that democracy promotion was ―never‖ the ―overriding goal‖ of American foreign policy; 
it works more ―in concert‖ with other objectives and is often subjugated to higher 
objectives. 
In the context of the Middle East, the United States sought to secure its national 
security interests by counterbalancing communist influence and then by promoting the 
peaceful relations between Israel and its Arab neighbors in addition to ensuring the 
stability of the oil rich region by promoting disarmament and controlling radicalism. In 
the Egyptian context, US assistance was used initially as a tool to secure peace between 
Egypt and Israel. Over the years, US interests became more diversified with the inclusion 
of securing support for American peace efforts in the Middle East, counterterrorism 
strategies and the provision of a base for military operations in the region (Dunne 
2005).While Egypt has been the recipient of US economic assistance since 1975 during 
the negotiations of peace with Israel, the amount was not substantial till 1979 after the 
signature of the Camp David Agreement when Egypt became the second largest recipient 
of US assistance after Israel.  Under the ―Special International Security Assistance Act of 
1979‖, the United States provided both Israel and Egypt with economic and military 
assistance ―at a ratio of 3 to 2 respectively‖ (Sharp 2007, 10). Egypt received on average 
$2 billion a year in economic and military assistance. Economic assistance amounted to 
$815 million on average annually. As Israel renegotiated in 1999 a decrease in its 
economic assistance in return for increasing its military assistance, the reduction in 
economic assistance was also applied to Egypt, after agreement with the Egyptian 
government, even though Egyptian military assistance did not increase. Thus, as 
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illustrated in table 1, economic assistance to Egypt was slashed by almost $40 million a 
year starting 1999 till it reached $415 million in 2008 (Sharp 2006). Economic Assistance 
was then reduced drastically in 2009 to reach $200 million to indicate dissatisfaction with 
the Egyptian government’s repressive policies. Furthermore, the delivery of $200 million 
of military assistance to Egypt became conditional on the testimony of the U.S. Secretary 
of State ―that the Government of Egypt is taking concrete and measurable steps to 
address judicial reform, police abuse, and smuggling along the Sinai-Gaza border‖ (Sharp 
2007, 11). However, the restriction on the release of the $200 million in military aid was 
removed later by Secretary Rice in March 2008 (Essam El-Din 2008). 
Table 1: US Assistance to Egypt from 1998 to 2008  
(In $ Millions) 
Fiscal Year Economic Assistance Military Assistance 
1998 815.0 1,300.0 
1999 775.0 1,300.0 
2000 727.3 1,300.0 
2001 695.0 1,300.0 
2002 655.0 1,300.0 
2003 911.0
9
 1,300.0 
2004 571.6 1,292.3 
2005 530.7 1,289.6 
2006 490.0 1,287.0 
2007 450.0 1,300.0 
2008 411.6 1,289.4 
Source: Sharp 2008 
 
Up to 2008, economic assistance provided through USAID to Egypt amounted to 
more than $28 billion. From 1975 to 2007, more than half of USAID economic 
assistance, $15.21 billion, was allocated to improving the Environment for Trade and 
Investment while $5.75 billion was spent on Infrastructure projects. Total allocation for 
                                                 
9
 Even though Egypt was to receive $611 million in FY2003, it has received supplemental aid 
under the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act (P.L. 108-11) to counter the effect of the 
Iraq War on the Egyptian economy in the amount of $300 million to repay loan guarantees 
(Sharp, 2008). 
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democracy and governance was $1.07 billion while the amount allocated for improving 
basic education was $1.05 billion. Support provided to the Health sector amounted to 
$934.8 million (Program Overview 2009). Over the past three decades, the focus of 
USAID has shifted from one sector to the other. In the 70s, USAID projects focused on 
infrastructure and the provision of basic needs. The reopening of the Suez Canal was 
among the most prominent infrastructure projects in addition to upgrading the existing 
infrastructure in terms of electric power and water supply as well as improving 
telecommunications.  
In the 80s, USAID projects were aimed at enhancing the living conditions through 
implementing projects aimed at improving health services and basic education. USAID 
projects in this era also supported the Egyptian Government privatization efforts through 
the facilitation of credit for small private sector companies and programs aimed at 
facilitating market entry. In the 90s, USAID focused its efforts during this period on 
improving health services especially to women and children in addition to improving 
access to the infrastructure services. In the framework of facilitating the move to 
privatization, USAID also assisted non governmental organizations in developing their 
skills as an encouragement for private initiative in support of national development 
efforts. Starting 1999, with the reduction of economic assistance, the emphasis of USAID 
projects became the improvement investment opportunities and the enhancement of trade. 
Encouraging ―citizen participation‖ in development became a central objective of USAID 
projects in the new millennium. USAID also implemented projects aiming at enhancing 
socioeconomic conditions by providing better education prospects as well as improving 
health services in addition to environmental protection (USAID-Egypt History 2009).  
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3.2. USAID Democracy Assistance Programs in Egypt 
USAID has been the primary US provider of democracy assistance worldwide; 
from 1990 to 2005, it has provided almost $8.47 billion in constant 2000 U.S. dollars to 
120 countries to fund projects that were either planned by USAID but implemented by 
contractors or planned and implemented by local or international NGOs in areas of 
interest to USAID (Improving Democracy 2008). However, democracy promotion is a 
relatively new objective for US assistance in the context of the Middle East region 
(Carothers 1999). The new democracy promotion objective became amplified after the 
September 11
th
 attacks which led in 2002 to the creation of the Middle East Partnership 
Initiative (MEPI), managed by the State Department, which is perceived as a cornerstone 
in the Bush administration pursuit of Middle East democracy (Sharp 2005). The MEPI 
has four goals: political, economic, and educational reform as well as empowering 
Middle Eastern women. US officials attempted to embellish the political reform objective 
by introducing the notion of ―partnership‖ with Arab governments in the pursuit of 
reform (Sharp 2005, 2). The MEPI targeted the Middle East region as a whole, however, 
its activities are different in terms of scope and size from one country to the other. Its 
most extensive operation had been in Morocco and Yemen, while its operations in Egypt 
and Saudi Arabia have been quite limited due to the regimes’ opposition of its operational 
scope (Sharp 2005). In 2003, USAID also revised its 2000-2009 strategic plan and 
amended it to fit with MEPI objectives by expanding its democracy and governance 
programs in Egypt. The notion of strengthening political competition was also included 
as an objective in the revised strategic plan (USAID/Egypt Strategic Plan 2004). 
33 
 
 
 
Even though economic assistance to Egypt was on a downward slope for the last 
decade, democracy assistance did not follow that pattern. As shown in table 2, in 1998, 
prior to the reduction of economic assistance, total democracy and governance assistance 
from 1990 to 1998 was $164 million, this figure was more than doubled by 2004  (Finkel, 
Perez-Linan and Seligson  2006). By 2008, this figure was up to $1 billion almost a triple 
the amount allocated for the 2004 fiscal year (Program Overview 2009). While 
democracy assistance figures were modest compared to governance in earlier years, with 
the reduction of economic assistance in 2009, $45 million, almost a quarter of total 
economic assistance, was allocated to democracy programs (Sharp 2008). Thus, the 
democracy component tripled its amount from $ 15 million in 1999 to $45 million, in 
2009. 
Table 2: USAID Democracy and Governance Assistance to Egypt (1991-2004)10 
(In Constant 2000 $ Millions) 
Fiscal Year Rule of Law Electoral Aid Civil Society Governance Total 
1991   0.37  0.37 
1992   1.40  1.4 
1993   2.17 .57 2.74 
1994   2.99 1.21 4.2 
1995 11.83  6.22 1.97 20.02 
1996 23.03  7.86 9.84 40.73 
1997 13.82  8.86 14.94 37.62 
1998 4.69  9.52 43.19 57.4 
1999 5.04  5.10 41.67 51.81 
2000 2.96  3.46 11.27 17.69 
2001   2.60 19.36 21.96 
2002   4.41 17.98 22.39 
2003 3.44  7.19 4.98 15.61 
2004 10.25 1.16 5.36 6.58 22.19 
Total 75.06 1.16 67.51 173.56 316.13 
Source: Finkel, Perez-Linan and Seligson 2006 
 
                                                 
10
 The figures presented here are extracted from the SPSS data set provided by Finkel, Perez-Linan and 
Seligson in the context of their study of the effects of US democracy assistance. The SPSS data file could 
be downloaded from http://www.pitt.edu/~politics/democracy/downloads/USAID_DG_Programs.sav 
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USAID democracy and governance portfolio generally includes five components: 
―strengthening the rule of law and respect for human Rights‖, ―promoting more genuine 
elections and competitive political processes‖, ―increased development of a politically 
active civil society‖, ―more transparent and accountable governance‖, and ―promoting 
free and independent media‖ (USAID: Democracy and Governance 2009). In the case of 
Egypt, even though a number of democracy-oriented projects were implemented in the 
late 80s and beginning of the 90s, democracy promotion was not highlighted as a policy 
goal until much later. Due to the nature of the aid agreement signed with Egypt, which 
gave the Egyptian government the authority to decide on the allocation of assistance, the 
ability to use aid to pursue political reform was quite limited (Dunne 2005). USAID 
democracy and governance projects in Egypt have traditionally used a ―bilateral‖ 
approach that required the agreement of the recipient country with regards to the various 
projects’ objectives and implementation which limited the type of projects that could be 
implemented, however, in 2005 the ―bilateral‖ approach was abandoned, the US 
Congress stipulated that ―democracy and governance activities shall not be subject to the 
prior approval of the GoE [government of Egypt]‖ (Sharp 2008, 23).   
The first USAID democracy assistance projects in Egypt targeted civil society. 
Initially, USAID was ―reluctant to upset‖ the Egyptian government which made it avoid 
funding controversial activities or groups, thus, when attempting to develop an active 
civil society USAID initially targeted non governmental service organizations that are 
registered with the Ministry of Social Affairs and avoided the human rights organizations 
(Al Sayyid 1999, 61). The support for civil society, which in the context of USAID was 
equated to private voluntary organizations or non governmental organizations, started 
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with two objectives: promoting democracy and liberalizing the economy (Carothers and 
Ottoway 2000a). The first projects supporting civil society, namely the Neighborhood 
Urban Services and Local Development I and II, focused on service NGOs in an effort to 
promote decentralization and encourage privatization in the 80s and early 90s. These first 
projects mainly provided grants to NGOs to implement projects they proposed in order to 
alleviate the hardship faced by the poor in neglected areas. Training was also provided in 
the context of these projects but was mainly centered on upgrading their management 
skills. Democracy promotion became more central in the late 90s at the end of the 
following project, the Private Voluntary Organizations (PVO) project, when the 
promotion of advocacy skills was added as an objective (PVO Development Project 
Report 1990). The following project, the NGO Service Center, targeted from the 
beginning the promotion of NGO advocacy skills (NGO Service Center 2005).  
As for the rule of law component, USAID implemented a number of projects 
targeting the civil, commercial, criminal and family justice systems. The Administration 
of Justice Support projects (AOJS) I and II, which started in 1996 and continued through 
2009, were aimed at strengthening the capacity of civil and commercial courts. The first 
Administration of Justice Support project aimed at increasing the efficiency of two civil 
and commercial courts in North Cairo and Ismailia. Through the project training was 
provided to judges and court personnel and efforts were made to automate the court 
systems. The second Administration of Justice Support project picked up on the first 
project activities and expanded the use of automated systems developed for the pilot 
models to civil and commercial courts nationwide. The project also included capacity 
building of two Ministry of Justice institutions: the National Center for Judicial Studies 
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and the Judicial Information Center. Other rule of law programs aimed at reforming the 
criminal justice system including the enhancement of the public defense system and 
raising awareness of human rights and due process ideals among prosecutors and judges.  
USAID projects also targeted the family justice system with programs that were 
dedicated to build its capacity through creating an automated monitoring system for 
mediation in addition to raising public awareness of legal rights and services provided for 
families (Programs & Governorates 2009).  
Support for elections and political processes was absent from USAID democracy 
and governance portfolio in Egypt until the Egyptian announcement of allowing 
contestants in the presidential elections of 2005. USAID provided electoral assistance in 
anticipation for the elections through the provision of aid to both the Government of 
Egypt and civil society to create awareness and encourage participation in the elections. 
USAID granted both financial and technical assistance to three Egyptian domestic 
monitors in addition to providing an international monitoring team for both the 
Presidential and Parliamentary elections. USAID provided assistance to the Arab Penal 
Reform Organization (APRO), a non governmental human rights organization, to help it 
train 250 of its members as election monitors for the Presidential and Parliamentary 
elections in addition to helping it advocating for electoral reforms. USAID also provided 
grants to the NAS to promote the participation of Egyptians with disabilities in their 
communities as well as providing training for Ministry of Interior officials and local 
government officials to educate them about the difficulties faced by persons with 
disabilities. USAID has also developed a project aimed at enhancing the capacity 
building for political parties and their leaders in terms of providing training on internal 
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management and campaigning as well as creating collaboration with other political 
parties in the pursuit for political reform (Programs & Governorates 2009). 
With regards to the promotion of an independent media, USAID initially started 
by providing training to journalists and expanded its activities to include professionals in 
broadcast media.  USAID launched its Media Development Program in (MDP) in 2006 to 
provide training to media professionals and managers as well as technical assistance to 
Egyptian media outlets whether print or broadcast in addition to strengthening the 
capacity of media training institutions. The MDP project is scheduled to run for five 
years and focuses its activities in Cairo, Alexandria, Aswan and Minya governorates (El 
Madany 2007).  
3.3. The Civil Society Approach to Promote Democracy 
Prior to the start of the civil society assistance projects, in 1979, there were close 
to 2,600 Private Voluntary Organizations (PVO) which were, according to law, registered 
with the Ministry of Social Affairs (MSA) (NGO Service Center 2005). By 2003, almost 
14,000 non governmental organizations were registered with the MSA (Hawthorne 
2005). Many attribute this boom in the number of NGOs to the abundance of donor 
funding for this sector in the last two decades. Egyptian civil society is composed of five 
sectors: the religious sector, service non governmental organizations, professional 
associations, solidarity associations, and prodemocracy/advocacy groups (Hawthorne 
2005). As mentioned earlier, non-governmental organizations are at the heart USAID 
projects, thus, the nature of the beneficiary NGOs and their internal as well as external 
dynamics will be explored in greater detail later in the thesis in the framework of the case 
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study, however, at this point I will provide a brief overview of the different segments of 
civil society.   
The religious sector, with its variety of organizations and groups, with the 
exception of the Muslim Brotherhood whom I believe are to be excluded since they seek 
control over the state, is the most prevalent in terms of political activism and the deepest 
rooted in civil society as a result of its long involvement in the provision of services to 
the underprivileged who constitute a large segment of the Egyptian population. Service 
NGOs mainly play at the very least a supplemental role in the provision of state services 
if not in certain instances being a surrogate for it (Hawthorne 2005). Professional 
associations have emerged in last two decades of the nineteenth century with the 
establishment of the lawyers’ syndicate in 1888 and increased continuously to reach 24 
syndicates by the year 2000. Traditionally, Syndicates have been quite active on the 
political front, however, their political role became severely limited after the introduction 
of the syndicates’ law in 1993 (Kandil 2006).  
The solidarity associations, which are funded by members and mostly organized 
in an informal way, mainly provide social services which are limited to their members as 
opposed to service NGOs which target members outside their organizations. 
Prodemocracy or Advocacy groups, the latest addition to the civil society scene, remain 
limited in terms of number and membership and are generally engaged in civic education 
(Hawthorne 2005). Advocacy groups emerged in the mid 80s and were mainly operating 
in the area of Human Rights (Kandil 2006). Many of the advocacy groups try to attract 
attention to the rights of some neglected sectors of society such as youth and women 
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(Hawthorne 2005). By the end of 2007, there were 61 advocacy groups operating in 
Egypt (Kandil 2008). 
The development of the Egyptian civil society went through various stages. The 
first stage, in the early 19
th
 and 20
th
 century prior to the start of European colonialism, 
civil society was mainly populated by guilds and charity organizations some of which 
funded by Awqaf or Islamic endowments. Following the advent of European colonialism, 
new forms of associations began to surface such as professional associations and cultural 
clubs. The third stage, which started after independence, was characterized by the 
imposition of restrictions on civil society by the new government in its effort to secure its 
hold over power (Hawthorne 2005). After the ascension of the free officers to power in 
Egypt, the surge in civil society activism was curtailed whether by means of suppression 
or cooption i.e., making them part of state institutions. Many organizations were closed, 
others were swollen by government institutions, and some were forced underground. In 
1964, the government formulated law of 32 to control the activities of voluntary or non 
governmental organizations starting with their formation, which needed authorization 
from the Ministry of Social Affairs, to their activities which were to be monitored and 
approved by the same ministry. Funding was a main area of focus for these regulations 
especially with regards to foreign funding provided through donors not operating within 
Egypt which stipulated the need for prior approval from the ministry. Some types of 
organizations were not severely hindered by these regulations, such as the Islamic service 
NGOs and professional associations which had their own sources of funding, while 
others faced dwindling funding in addition to being constantly harassed and subjected to 
the threat of being dissolved (Langhor 2004).  
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The fourth stage, in the 80s, witnessed a relaxation of the restrictive environment 
in which civil society operated (Hawthorne 2005). The Egyptian government was willing 
to let donors fund service NGOs in support for decentralization in the area of service 
provision which actually supplemented government services and eased the financial 
burdens of the government and made it focus its efforts on privatization.  Human rights 
and advocacy NGOs were also able to get back into operation sidestepping the 
restrictions of the 1964 law by registering as civil companies.  Among the advocacy 
groups established in the 80s, Nawal al Saadawi's Arab Women's Solidarity Association 
and the Arab Organization of Human Rights which was the first human rights group in 
Egypt with a base in Cairo and extended activities to the rest of the Arab region.  
The fifth stage, started by the end of the 90s, with the increased donor attention to 
civil society and encouragement of advocacy, the Egyptian government became less 
tolerant of advocacy groups and began formulating a new law to restrict their operations. 
The new law, law 153, retained some of the earlier restrictions of law 32 with regards to 
governmental approval for formation of NGOs and receipt of foreign funding, but added 
new requirements stipulating that NGOs registered as civil companies needed to register 
themselves under the new law or be dissolved. Furthermore, the law prohibited NGOs 
from engaging in political issues, thus providing the basis for refusal of registration for a 
number of advocacy NGOs. Even though the law faced high level of criticism from civil 
society organizations and donors, the government still passed it in 1999.  However, the 
law was later found technically unconstitutional because of the absence of prior approval 
by the Shura Council.  Still, the Egyptian government formulated another restrictive law, 
law 84, in 2001.  Even though law 84 toned down some of the restrictive elements of its 
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predecessor especially with respect to the area of political activism which was to be 
subject to discussion between NGOs and the ministry, it added new restrictions such as 
the government right to freeze funds allocated to NGOs if they have joined international 
networks without the permission of the government.  Furthermore, while earlier laws 
have been silent on the issue of getting government permission for foreign funding 
provided by donors who have been already been working in Egypt, the new law required 
permission by the ministry before accepting such funding (Langhor 2004).  
The United States has been reluctant to support the ―bottom up‖ approach in 
general in the Middle East in fear of destabilizing a region that is strategically important 
for the preservation of US interests (Carothers and Ottoway 2000a). Democratization in 
the Middle East and in Egypt in particular was to be attained through a ―gradual‖ 
approach with ―minimum conflict‖ not through the promotion of political competition 
which can lead to instability of a ―friendly‖ regime (Hawthorne 2005, 99). The United 
States was also reluctant to pressure its major ally in the Middle East on the issue of 
democracy, so it began targeting civil society in its efforts to promote democratization. In 
the beginning of USAID assistance to civil society in Egypt, with the emphasis on 
depoliticizing this approach, assistance targeted only service NGOs and was presented as 
a tool towards encouraging decentralization and private cooperation in promoting 
development. USAID saw service NGOs as a platform where citizens can be exposed to 
democratic processes through participating in decision making for low key issues, leading 
to the state recognizing the positive impact of these organizations and as a result allowing 
more participation in decision making. The fact that service NGOs constituted a large 
part of the NGO community was perceived as an advantage in terms of their ability to 
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counterbalance state influence. Service NGOs were also non Islamist, therefore, they 
were seen as a safe choice since empowering them does not threaten the state nor US 
interest in the region as opposed to the Islamic sector of civil society, which has been 
ignored by the United States in its efforts to strengthen civil society, even though many 
believed it to be the only sector in civil society capable of mobilizing the citizenry 
because of the unique popular support it enjoyed, due to long term involvement in the 
efforts to alleviate economic hardship (Hawthorne 2005). Prodemocracy and advocacy 
groups, even though small in number and lacking popular support, were also targeted by 
civil society assistance. Prodemocracy groups had a special appeal because they are seen 
as aiming directly to induce democratization (Hawthorne 2005).  
In the early 90s, programs of civil society assistance were aimed at strengthening 
the managerial capacities of service NGOs so that they can manage their service projects 
more efficiently. The provided training included to a lesser extent some ―democracy 
skills‖ such as citizenry mobilization skills and supervision of governmental institutions 
(Hawthorne 2005, 33). In 1997, the US Department of State established the Middle East 
Democracy Fund that provided additional funding to USAID for supporting 
prodemocracy groups in developing their management skills as well as launching voter 
and civic education programs among other areas. By the late 90s, advocacy training 
became an integral part of training provided to NGOs even though the emphasis 
remained on its apolitical nature as illustrated in one of the USAID reports which stressed 
that:  
―Advocacy is defined as an action, rooted in a broad-based community 
need or interest, taken by NGOs to represent themselves and their constituency to 
public officials or the public in general. In the Egyptian case, this is exclusive of 
religious and political interests‖ (Hawthorne 2005, 34).  
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In 2008, the United States highly politicized its approach towards civil society assistance 
by specifying that 50 % of the allocated funds for democracy assistance for fiscal year 
2009 should be channeled to Egyptian non-governmental organizations quarter (Sharp 
2008).  
  Civil society assistance provided through USAID suffered from design and 
implementation problems that limited their effectiveness. With regards to design, USAID 
adopted a ―narrow definition‖ of civil society identifying them initially with the 
―politically acceptable‖ service NGOs (Hawthorne 2005, 17). Targeting service NGOs as 
a route to democracy promotion presented a problem due to the fact that they do not 
represent the people nor have a democracy agenda in addition to the fact that they were to 
a large extent controlled by the government. Even when later on, the focus expanded to 
include prodemocracy groups, the fact that these groups had no popular support base to 
draw on made them an easy target for government attacks on their credibility. 
Furthermore, the assistance to civil society focused extensively on improving managerial 
skills which was seen as the barrier to a functional civil society that can promote 
democratization, while it ignored the impediments posed by the legal environment NGOs 
have to work within. Additionally, the exclusion of political issues from the areas for 
advocacy to be promoted made the focus on side issues which do not have a direct impact 
on democratization.  
With regards to implementation, the management of projects was characterized by 
heavy bureaucratization due to the practice of hiring contractors for implementation 
which resulted in making even a primary issue such as the process of applying for 
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funding quite tedious. Furthermore, the fact that the NGOs who were to be funded had to 
be approved by the government not only limited funding to specific type of organizations 
but also caused delays in funding and allowed the Egyptian  government to monitor 
closely NGOs and their activities. Moreover, funding was also provided to US priority 
concerns, such as the environment, which were not necessarily primary concerns for the 
Egyptian society or for the non governmental organizations that sought to get funding 
which may have resulted in the increase in the numbers of NGOs working in these areas 
as well as the diversification of activities or shift of focus of some service NGOs, in order 
for them to be eligible for getting funds, instead of focusing on the actual needs of their 
communities (Hawthorne 2005).      
3.4. NGO Targeted Programs Implemented in Egypt 
Even though USAID projects in support of civil society started in the first half of the 
1980s, the focus of these early assistance projects was not democracy promotion. Early 
USAID projects in support of civil society are better seen an illustration of the 
developmental approach initially utilized by USAID to promote democracy in the 
Egyptian context. The first project, the Neighborhood Urban Services (NUS) Project, 
which started in 1981, provided funding and technical assistance to service NGOs, 
focused on the provision of services to neglected areas, as well as local government in 
Cairo and Alexandria (Neighborhood Urban Service 1983). Similarly, the following 
projects, the Local Development (LD) I and II projects, which started in the second half 
of the 1980s and ended in the beginning of the 1990s, followed the same path as the first 
project and attempted to expand the activities initiated by the NUS Project to the rest of 
Egyptian governorates (Local Development 1993). The Private Voluntary Organizations 
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(PVO) Development Project launched by USAID in 1992 incorporated for the first time 
the notion of democracy promotion and actually focused towards the end on increasing 
citizen participation in decision making and added the objective of developing PVO 
capacities in advocacy  to its original objective of strengthening the organizational 
capacities of NGOs (PVO Development 1990). The following project, the NGO Service 
Center, continued this trend by shifting the focus of civil society assistance from 
strengthening the organizational capacities as means in promoting economic 
development, as an indirect path to democracy, to promotion of civil society participation 
in public decision-making as the illustrated in the project evaluation report stating in the 
context of this project: ―the purpose of USAID support for Egyptian NGOs was no longer 
improved services but increased citizen and civil society participation in public decision-
making‖ (NGO Service center 2005, 4). In the following sections, a brief description of 
USAID civil society projects prior to the NGO service center project is presented, while 
the NGO center project, which is used as the case study, is discussed in detail in the 
following chapter. 
3.4.1. The Neighborhood Urban Services (NUS) project 
The Neighborhood Urban Services project was a five year project, starting 1981 
and ending 1985, with a total cost of $ 102.9 million including a $ 13.9 million 
contribution by the Egyptian government. The Project grant agreement was signed on 
August 19, 1981. The aim of the Neighborhood Urban project was to upgrade the living 
conditions of the population in Greater Cairo and Alexandria by supporting 
decentralization through two main channels: improving the capabilities at the local level 
and building the capacities of private voluntary organizations which can reach and fulfill 
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the needs of those unreachable by the government. Initially, the project was to be 
implemented by a USAID contractor who was to be responsible for operation and 
implementation of the project while USAID was responsible for setting policies in 
cooperation with Egyptian government officials. However, due to constant delays 
suffered in the process of implementing the project, in 1983, a committee combining 
members from the government, USAID, the technical assistance contractor was 
established to supervise the project and handle both operational and policy decisions 
(Neighborhood Urban Service 1983). 
Assistance to private voluntary organizations targeted two areas: improving their 
management capabilities so that they can design and carry on projects, and assisting them 
in promoting local initiative to satisfy local needs. Three private voluntary organizations 
groups were identified in the context of the project, well funded welfare organizations 
that provide individual services, under funded community development organizations, 
and special interest organizations such as the organizations for migrants. The project 
targeted only the welfare and community development organizations.  The funding for 
projects carried out by these organizations was perceived as a way to decentralize service 
provision and to handle it more efficiently especially because of their knowledge of 
localities and the needs of their population. However as the project unfolded the fallacy 
of this perception was revealed since most of the private voluntary organizations were 
actually run by upper class individuals who did not reside in the areas their organizations 
provide services to, therefore, they were actually providing social welfare. Still there 
were some organizations which were actually interested in ―community development‖ 
(Neighborhood Urban Service 1983). 
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Furthermore, the project suffered a number of structural problems that limited its 
impact. First, the fact that the objective of the project was a bit imprecise in terms of 
goals to be achieved by the end of the project led to an arbitrary allocation of funds 
between the different types of capacity building activities and also made evaluating the 
outcomes of the project. Second, due to legal stipulations that prohibit direct contact 
between a PVO and foreign entities, access was possible only through MSA and funding 
was made available only to organizations recognized by MSA. Third, to be entitled to 
project funding, a PVO had to meet three criteria: having a sound annual plan, keeping 
regular records and the presence of technical staff in addition to a functioning board of 
directors. As a result of the criteria set for funding, most funds went to welfare groups 
rather than going to community development groups who were not as well established as 
the welfare groups. Fourth, the fact that the government shared in the funding of the 
project, a share that was delayed, and that funding needed to go through MSA has 
affected the planned allocations, by 1983 the expenditure on the improvement of 
districts’ capabilities have surpassed the allocated funding while the expenditure for 
funding private voluntary organizations was seriously lagging behind. Initially 13% of 
total project funding was supposed to be allocated to the PVO component of the project. 
However, after two years from the start of the project, only $ 2.6 million were spent of 
the $ 4.2 million allocated for this phase (Neighborhood Urban Service 1983). 
 3.4.2. Local Development (LD) I and II Projects 
The Local Development I and II projects, which initially extended from 1986 to 
1992, started as a follow up to the Neighborhood Urban Services Project. The projects 
were mainly aimed at decentralization and they included a Private Voluntary 
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Organization (PVO) Component based on the conception of private voluntary 
organizations’ pivotal role in ―the development of citizen participation‖ and their ability 
to ―ensure privatization as an approach towards development‖ (Local Development 1993, 
7). The activities, initiated by the NUS project in Greater Cairo and Alexandria, were 
extended to the rest of the Egyptian governorates. The program goal was still identified, 
similarly to the NUS project, as ―to improve the life of low income residents in rural and 
urban Egypt by providing greater access to essential basic services‖ (Local Development 
1993, 7). After the end of the LD II project in 1992, it was followed by a transition period 
with the aim of monitoring the expenditure of the grants and providing technical 
assistance to PVOs (NGO Service Center 2005).  
The Local Development projects were implemented, as the previous NUS project 
was, by a USAID contractor. On the Egyptian side, there were two government 
counterparts in the implementation of the project, namely the Ministry of Local 
Administration (MLA) and the Ministry of Social Affairs (MSA). During the course of 
the project, changes were made to its guidelines and it was stipulated that policy 
decisions for the project needed approval from the Ministry of Planning. The variety of 
procedural requirements imposed by the number of ministries involved on the Egyptian 
side caused delays in funding and consequently in the implementation of the project. The 
PVO component provided grants and training to PVOs to the 26 governorates. Grants 
were given to PVOs to carry on their proposed projects in addition to training on 
planning and carrying out projects, assessing the needs of their localities, evaluating the 
implemented projects, garnering the local support necessary for their projects and 
consequently getting additional sources of funding.  PVOs were also trained on how to 
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design training programs and implement them in the areas of fund raising and enhancing 
citizen participation.  The PVOs approved projects were financed through USAID grants 
as well as a 5% contribution by the Egyptian Government in addition to a 10-25% being 
financed by the PVO that proposed the project. Within the framework of the project, a 
tracking system for monitoring funds given to PVOs was also designed and installed at 
MSA and in the governorates’ Regional offices. The project included four cycles of 
funding to PVOs. By the end of the fourth cycle, PVOs have received grants from 
USAID through the LD II project amounting to LE 150 million to implement their 
projects. Almost all allocated funds for the first three cycles were spent, however, only 
84% of the allocated funds for cycle 4 were spent which was the main reason the project 
added a transitional period towards its end to monitor the expenditure of these funds 
(Local Development 1993).  
With respect to the training component which was initiated in 1989, the Ministry 
of Local Administration was the governmental counterpart for USAID. By the end of the 
project, only 34% out the total allocated funds for training in the 26 governorates were 
spent with some governorates not use any of their allocated funds such as the Red Sea, 
Damietta and North Sinai. Training was provided to 7455 members of PVOs in the 26 
governorates. The poor performance of the project’s training component was a result of 
the poor coordination and delays of funding.  Governorates’ offices were also reluctant to 
allocate funds for training of PVOs who were seen as capable of getting funding for 
training on their own. The training component suffered many problems due to the lack of 
trainers in certain desert and Upper Egypt governorates in addition to the hiring of 
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unqualified personnel as trainers because of their personal connections (Local 
Development 1993).   
3.4.3. Private Voluntary Organizations (PVO) Project  
The Private Voluntary Organizations (PVO) Project actually started in 1992 
before the end of the transitional phase of the Local Development II project and ended in 
2000 (NGO Service Center 2005). In describing the Private Voluntary Organizations 
(PVO) Project, breaking away from earlier projects’ objectives’ formulation, the project 
document stated that ―this project is a major element of USAID’s program objectives to 
promote open societies, democratic pluralism and popular participation in Egypt's 
development‖ (PVO Development 1990, 4-5). The inclusion of democracy as an 
objective was a new notion as opposed to the regular objective of increased popular 
participation with a developmental context that was the theme of previous projects. 
However, the PVO project was still shaped by the perception of the weaknesses of 
Egyptian NGOs in terms of organizational and managerial abilities. Thus, the PVO 
Project aimed to build up these abilities. The budget for the project was $6 million for 
private voluntary organizations that were already registered with USAID in addition to 
$0.5 million to those in the process of registering (PVO Development 1990).  
As a result of the problems encountered in the previous project in terms of 
complexity of funding and lengthy approval procedures, the PVO project grants were not 
routed through the local government. The project used an Umbrella Management 
Institution (UMI), as opposed to the use of contractors in previous projects, the National 
Congress of Negro Women (NCNW), a U.S. PVO, was responsible for channeling grants 
to the beneficiary NGOs. The project also created a PVO Advisory Council (PACE) that 
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included members from USAID, beneficiary NGOs, representatives of the Ministry of 
Social Affairs and experts in civil society. The role of the council was to perform certain 
tasks to ensure the project’s efficient operation which included reviewing grant selection 
criteria and the procedures used by the UMI in implementing the project. The grants were 
directed to improve the PVO capabilities as opposed to the NUS project grants which 
were mostly used to buy equipment. Still, the project document stipulated that ―funds are 
granted for only these types of activities which have the support of the [Government of 
Egypt] GOE and USAID‖ (PVO Development 1990). 
The Project had two phases: the first phase started January 1992 to be followed by 
the second phase which started October1996 and ended January 2000. Total Funding for 
both phases amounted to $27 million. More than a year after the start of phase two, in 
October 1997, a new objective was added to the project namely ―to increase citizen 
participation in decision making‖ (NCNW Response 2000, 2). However due to time 
limitations and the fact that the initial design of the project was not to promote the 
advocacy skills of PVOs, the UMI was unable to fulfill the new objective. Beneficiary 
Egyptian PVOs were concerned about the new objective and were reluctant to be labeled 
as advocacy groups even though the UMI has tried to put advocacy in a ―development 
context‖ by designing training modules for different sectors such as health, women and 
children rights (NCNW Response 2000, 9). As a way to encourage NGOs to work 
collectively to increase their ability for advocacy, the UMI held two symposiums for 
NGOs. Among the PVO Development Program achievements in the field of 
strengthening advocacy abilities of NGOs, the initiation of a debate about the draft of the 
new law for NGOs by beneficiary PVOs during a symposium held by NCNW in 1998 
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which led to a series of meetings between NGOs and government officials to discuss the 
new NGO law (NCNW Response 2000). However, as mentioned earlier, the attempts to 
influence the Egyptian government with respect to the law formulation have failed in 
terms of relaxing restrictions on NGOs as I will discuss in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER FOUR  
THE NGO SERVICE CENTER PROJECT 
4.1. The Context of the Project  
To understand the course the NGO Service Center project took and evaluate its 
impact, it is imperative to understand the surrounding legal and political environment. 
The project started in an already hostile environment described as ―more authoritarian‖ 
than in the mid 80s (Brouwer 2000, 23). Prior to the initiation of the project, starting the 
early 90s, the Egyptian government tightened the restrictions on almost all forms of 
political activity which marked the end of the relaxation of state control that 
characterized the previous decade including making changes to the penal system in 1992 
to allow the government to impose harsher penalties on whomever it defines as a 
terrorist, passing of laws restricting Islamists’ control of syndicates and the further 
cancellation of elections of syndicates where these laws failed to enforce this limitation, 
the violent confrontations that accompanied the 1995 people’s assembly elections, and 
the new law of associations passed in 1999 (Al-Sayyid 2000).  Even before the passage of 
the new associations’ law, the Egyptian government has started its attack on NGOs and 
especially human rights organizations after the publishing of the US state department 
report on human rights in Egypt. The Egyptian government first made it clear to donors 
that no funding should be made available to human rights organizations then proceeded 
with a media campaign attacking the legitimacy of these organizations based on their 
dependence on foreign funding and accused them of defaming Egypt’s reputation on the 
international scene (Fouad, Ref’at and Murcos  2005). After the passage of law 153 of 
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1999, which replaced law 32 of 1964, some of the restrictions of its predecessor were 
kept in terms of requiring NGOs to be registered with the Ministry of Social Affairs, their 
funding being subject to approval from the ministry, and their survival being at the mercy 
of the same ministry which can dissolve them at any moment. The new law went the 
extra mile and closed earlier loopholes in its predecessor by requiring advocacy groups, 
which escaped the previous law by registering as civil companies, to be registered under 
the new law or close down and since the new law, as its predecessor, denies registration 
to NGOs engaged in political activities, this meant that the only way to go for some of 
these advocacy groups was to close down. Needless to say, both NGOs and donors tried 
to oppose this law. Efforts made by NGO representatives to help draft the law were in 
vain as all their propositions were ignored (Langhor 2005). The U.S. ambassador in Cairo 
discretely approached Egyptian officials raising US concerns about the NGO law while 
the U.S. State Department spokesman overtly criticized the law (Dunne 2005). USAID 
has also poured funds into studies for possible alternatives to the law (Brouwer 2000). 
Despite the opposition of Egyptian civil society and donors alike, law 153 of 1999 was 
passed imposing heavy restrictions on non governmental organizations. After the passage 
of the law, some human and women’s rights associations have tried to escalate the issue 
by calling for a united position on the part of all non-governmental organizations in 
opposition to the new NGO law. However, these efforts failed due to lack of cooperation 
and rising disagreement between the NGOs, some of which actually went on with 
registering under the new law compromising the united stand taken by other NGOs 
refusing registration (Langhor 2005).   
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Langhor (2005) attributes the failure of NGOs in their campaign against the 1999 
law to a number of elements including the lack of internal democratization of NGOs as 
well as the lack of consultation and cooperation between the different NGO groups, the 
disagreement between NGOs on whether they actually should have a political role or not, 
and the fact that almost all advocacy groups are dependent to a large extent on foreign 
funding which made them the target of attacks on their legitimacy. The fact is that 
advocacy NGOs, which were leading the effort to block the passage of the law, were 
dependent on foreign funding made it possible for the government to attack their 
legitimacy. Even when these groups have forsaken the foreign funding for the rest of 
their campaign to avoid the government’s accusations, they were unable to generate local 
funding because of their lack of a popular base and hence they became less able to mount 
an extensive campaign against the law. The problem of funding was also coupled with 
the problem of getting other types of NGOs to support their cause especially those who 
were mainly engaged in service delivery and even in certain cases other advocacy groups 
who saw themselves as weak and technically and financially underdeveloped and thus 
unable to oppose the regime (Langhor 2005). The fact that the NGOs mounting the 
opposition constituted a small part of Egyptian civil society also raised the issue of their 
representativeness of civil society which was used by the government to indicate that the 
opposition to the law is not universal and thus further weakening the position of the 
NGOs who were trying to block the law (Fouad, Ref’at and Murcos 2005). 
Beyond the legal restrictions imposed by the Egyptian government, it is also 
important to point to the special relationship between the Egyptian and the US 
governments resulting from American reliance on the Egyptian government backing its 
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policies in the Middle East making the US keen on preserving ―good relations‖ with 
Egypt and averse to any activities that may portray it as ―interfering‖ in Egyptian internal 
political affairs (Al-Sayyid 2000, 56). This relationship has at times led to the 
subordination of the democracy promotion objective to what the US considers priority 
foreign policy objectives, which resulted in a mild American stance vis-à-vis the 
Egyptian government’s repressive policies  as illustrated by the response of USAID 
director in Egypt when questioned about US reaction to human rights’ violations in 
―friendly‖ countries that are recipients of US economic assistance when he indicated that 
in these cases the United States will offer ―advice‖ and ―encouragement‖ but will not 
―exert pressure‖ (Al-Sayyid 2000, 62). In the case of the NGO law, high level pressure 
was not exerted because the primary concern at the time for the U.S. was the Middle East 
peace process and to some extent Egyptian economic reform (Dunne 2005). Furthermore, 
the fear of the possibility of a duplication of the ―Algerian Scenario‖ has often held back 
US democracy promotion strategies in Egypt (Brownlee 2002, 12). The United States and 
Western donors in general seem to be reconciled with the idea that it is better to have 
friendly authoritarian regimes in power than running the risk of having Islamists in 
control which actually makes them exclude Islamists from their support of civil society 
even though many believe these groups enjoy massive popular support and have the most 
potential of standing up to the government (Al-Sayyid 2000). However, it is important to 
note, as illustrated in the previous chapter, that the United States approach to democracy 
promotion in Egypt took a new turn on the eve of September 11
th
 attacks. Even though 
this new approach did not impact directly the NGO Service Center project design or 
implementation, it have contributed to certain changes in the political environment which 
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will be discussed at a later stage in this chapter when addressing the impact of assistance 
on the political regime. 
4.2. Project Objectives and Operational Scope  
The NGO Service Center was a high profile project with heavy allocations in an 
era of decreasing US economic assistance which indicated a certain level of commitment 
to democratization (Al-Sayyid 2000). The design of the NGO Service Center Activity 
started in 1995 with bilateral talks between the Governments of Egypt and the United 
States. By September 1998, these talks culminated in the signature of the USAID Grant 
Agreement between Egypt and the United States which designated the ―increase in civil 
society participation in public decision making‖ as the objective for the NGO Service 
Center Activity (NGO Service Center 2005, 3). This objective marked a shift in USAID 
assistance projects to civil society which previously focused on improving civil society 
organizations capabilities in the provision of services. The NGO Service Center Activity 
fell under USAID ―Strategic Objective 3: Increased Citizen Participation in Public 
Decision-Making‖ which had three intermediate results as identified by USAID and 
stated by the project documents: ―improved civil society advocacy skills, strengthened 
CSO organizational basis, [and] Egyptian NGO Center established‖ (Mid-Term 
Evaluation 2003, 2). A fourth intermediate result added by the contractors responsible for 
implementing the project was the ―increased citizen awareness of CSOs’ roles 
in/contributions to public life, including in public decision making‖ (NGO Service Center 
2005, 66).   
Even though the project was set to start May 1999, the start date was shifted to 
April 2000 as a result of the Egyptian government formulation of the new NGO law. The 
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new law, which was issued in 1999 as the NGO Service Center Activity was ready to be 
launched, expanded the Ministry of Insurance and Social Affairs’ powers over non 
governmental organizations allowing it to dissolve NGOs without recourse to the legal 
system. USAID decided to freeze the implementation of the project until the new law’s 
executive orders are issued since they may directly affect the institution to be established 
by the project i.e., the NGO Support Center, which would be registered under the new 
law and could face dissolution at any point as a result of the law’s stipulations. However, 
discussions with Egyptian civil society leaders convinced USAID to launch the project 
while reframing its statement of objectives. Eventually, the projects’ objective was 
changed in February 2000 in response to the Egyptian government’s criticism of the 
project objectives ―overly intrusive‖ nature, to fall under USAID Strategic Objective 21 
―Egyptian Initiatives in Governance and Participation Strengthened‖ with the 
intermediate result ―Capacity of Civil Society Organizations Improved to Participate in 
Development‖. This change in the objectives of the activity was made, as stated by 
project documents, to ―bring them [project objectives] more in harmony with Egyptian 
political reality‖, however, the modification of the project’s objective did not have an 
effect on the project design but were viewed as being merely ―a modification in the level 
and wording of the strategy‖ or simply an indirect way of stating the intended objectives 
which has no bearing on the design of the activity (Mid-Term Evaluation 2003, 21). 
USAID also changed the terminology used in describing the targeted CSO skill to be 
improved through the project from ―advocacy‖ to the ―more diplomatic phrase‖ the 
ability to initiate ―public-private dialogue‖ while maintaining that the ―development‖ 
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being promoted by the project was in the area of policy and decision making (NGO 
Service Center 2005, 66).   
Strengthening Civil Society organizations, in this case mainly NGOs, was seen as 
conducive to overall strengthening of Civil Society. Besides the improvement of 
technical skills that customary training sought to improve and to which advocacy was 
added, the NGO service center project aimed to tackle three issues that were seen as 
reasons for the weakness of Egyptian Civil Society: the shortage or lack of support 
organizations that provide assistance to civil society, the lack of networking and 
cooperation between civil society organizations, and the lack of awareness of the 
citizenry regarding civil society contribution. The project identified three strata of Civil 
Society Organizations (CSOs): ―primary‖, ―intermediary‖ and ―tertiary‖ CSOs (NGO 
Service Center 2005, 6). The first stratum, primary CSOs which account for up to 95% of 
Egyptian CSOs, exist at the local level and are engaged mainly in service provision 
whether for their members or for the society as a whole. The second stratum, 
intermediary CSOs which account for 2-3% of Egyptian CSOs, exist on the district level 
and are mainly providing support for primary CSOs whether in terms of facilitating 
access to technical support or political institutions that are usually beyond the reach of 
primary CSOs, still, they may also be engaged in service provision.  The third stratum, 
tertiary CSOs which account for up to 1-2% of Egyptian CSOs, are present at the national 
level and serve as the channel through which both primary and intermediary CSOs reach 
decision makers. Tertiary CSOs also seek to protect the CSO sector interest as a whole 
(NGO Service Center 2005). Recognizing the shortage of organizations at the 
intermediary and tertiary levels as well as the need for networking to build a stronger 
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civil society, the NGO Service Center project aimed to establish a ―legacy institution‖, 
the Egyptian NGO Support Center (ENGOSC), which would continue providing services 
similar to that provided by the project to Egyptian NGOs (NGO Service Center 2005, 5). 
To improve NGO networking during the span of the project itself, two national civil 
society conferences were held in Cairo in November 2001 and September 2003 in 
addition to a number of regional conferences in Beheira, North Sinai, Sharqiya and 
Aswan. Three resource centers, in Cairo, Tanta, and Assiut, were also set up and 
equipped with libraries and web access to provide information to CSOs as well as to 
provide them with a base for networking.  The resource centers held roundtable 
discussions for NGOs as a forum for communication and networking and also provided 
NGOs with manuals and other resource materials that could be useful for their operations 
(NGO Service Center 2005). With regards to increasing awareness of civil society 
organizations’ contributions, the project focused its efforts on increasing the coverage of 
CSOs in the media to raise citizens’ awareness levels as a step towards encouraging 
citizen participation in civil society (NGO Service Center 2005). 
The assistance provided through the NGO Service Center Project included three 
components: grants, training and technical assistance. The NGO Service Center project 
targeted the different CSO strata using different types of assistance. For the primary 
CSOs, the project provided small sub grants while it provided larger sub grants and 
technical training for intermediary and tertiary CSOs. The provided training focused on 
enhancing CSO self governance and management as well as advocacy skills. Self 
governance training focused on the issue of transparency and accountability while 
management skills’ training aimed at enhancing CSO project design and operational 
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abilities as well as developing financial sustainability. In general, five types of grants 
were provided to beneficiary NGOs. The first type, ―Civic Action Micro-grants‖ 
(CAMs)‖, was directed to smaller and recently established CDAs (Community 
Development Associations) with the aim of strengthening NGO advocacy abilities and 
assisting in citizen mobilization for participation in development efforts. The Second 
type, ―Civic Action Partnership‖ grants (CAP),  targeted intermediary and well 
established primary CSOs with the aim of improving networking between both groups in 
addition to enhancing the intermediary associations’ ability to provide grants to primary 
associations as well as improving the primary associations’ advocacy and citizenry 
mobilization skills (NGO Service Center 2005, 19). The third type, ―Institutional 
Development Grants‖ (IDGs), targeted medium sized well established CSOs with the aim 
of improving their advocacy skills with regards to issues of "national concern‖ with a 
specific focus on women, children, the disadvantaged and the handicapped. The fourth 
type, ―Institutional Support Grants‖ (ISGs), was initially targeted to strengthen NGO 
networks, however, due to shortage of networks and lack of applicants in this category, 
the grants were reallocated to create opportunities for CSOs to engage with each other 
and with decision makers in discussions on ―public concern issues‖ through the use of 
public forums (NGO Service Center 2005, 20). The fifth type, ―Intensive Capacity 
Development Grants‖ (ICDGs), was actually added towards the end of the project and 
aimed at strengthening the capacity of the specific CSOs which showed significant 
improvement in terms of organizational capacity during the project span (NGO Service 
Center 2005, 21). The project also provided training to CSOs to familiarize them with the 
terminology and practices in the field of advocacy as well as issues of internal 
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governance and sound management. Training focused on five areas: ―advocacy, 
governance, management, networking and gender‖ (NGO Service Center 2005, 30). 
Technical assistance, which as opposed to training mainly focused on the particular needs 
of the different organizations, was also provided. Pre-grants technical assistance aimed at 
improving CSOs proposal writing abilities while post-grant assistance focused on the 
improvement of a variety of abilities related to CSO internal functioning as well as their 
relationship with their constituencies (NGO Service Center 2005, 38).   
The project beneficiaries, according to the agreement between the American and 
Egyptian governments, had to be registered with the Ministry of Insurance and Social 
affairs and also approved for receipt of funding which meant the exclusion of human 
rights organizations (Al-Sayyid 2000). The design of the project did not set specific 
priority areas for which NGOs receive grants. The provision of grants was engineered to 
be ―demand-driven‖ which meant that the NGOs were the ones proposing the area of 
funding or the sector they wish to cover so that they can target priority areas of their 
community (NGO Service Center 2005, 28).  The tools used by the project, namely the 
provision of grants, training, and technical assistance, were perceived as playing an 
essential role in ―empowering of NGO memberships to act on their own and their 
communities’ behalf‖ (Mid-Term Evaluation 2003, 27). The NGO Service Center 
Activity was built on the notion that civil society is a ―viable channel‖ for mobilizing 
citizens to take part in development (Mid-Term Evaluation 2003, 26). For NGOs to 
perform that role, it’s essential that citizens take part in the design and operation of NGOs 
so that they can develop a sense of ownership with regards to the achievement of NGOs 
as a result of their involvement in decision making. Consequently, the positive effects of 
63 
 
 
 
citizens’ involvement for themselves and for their community encourage them to 
continue their efforts and help build a larger constituency for NGOs. The assumption, on 
which the intended results were based, was that the provided assistance to NGOs through 
the NGO service center project would lead to the increasing efficiency of those NGOs in 
fulfilling citizen needs which would lead to convincing citizens of the value of 
participation in NGOs and eventually lead to greater citizen participation in NGOs (Mid-
Term Evaluation 2003). The following model, figure 1, was used by the NGO Service 
Center project evaluators to explain how the project is intended to lead to increased 
community and citizen participation in decision making (Mid-Term Evaluation 2003, 27).  
Figure 1: Community and Citizen-Based Model of the NGO Service Center  
 
Source: Mid-Term Evaluation of the NGO Service Center 2003 
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4.3. Project Stakeholders  
The project stakeholders besides beneficiary NGOs include the US and Egyptian 
governments, the USAID, the contractors responsible for the implementation of the 
project, and the Egyptian Government counterpart in the implementation of the project 
namely the Ministry of Insurance and Social Affairs (MISA)
11
. The project design also 
provided for two entities set up by the project namely the NGO Advisory Board and the 
Steering Committee which combine representatives from the original stakeholders. The 
NGO Service Center Activity, similarly to other USAID projects, was to be implemented 
through contractors. Three contractors were awarded in conjunction the implementation 
of the project: Save the Children, America’s Development Foundation (ADF), and 
Infonex. Each contractor had a specified role in the implementation of the activity: Save 
the Children, which was the main contractor, was responsible for financial matters 
including management of the project’s grant system while ADF was responsible for the 
project’s technical assistance component including training, and Infonex was responsible 
for the monitoring and documentation of project progress as well as reporting to USAID. 
The three contractors represented what was called by project documents as the Project 
Implementing Entity (NGO Service Center 2005). The role of the US and Egyptian 
governments was more pronounced in the initial design of the project, it mainly consisted 
of developing an agreement that will set the course for the project objectives and 
implementation. The negotiation process was quite difficult due to the opposition of the 
Egyptian government to the initial project objectives which resulted at the end in the 
acquiescence of the US government to the Egyptian government conditions of limiting 
                                                 
11
 The name of the Ministry of Social Affairs (MISA) was changed to Ministry of Social Solidarity early 
2006.  
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assistance to NGOs registered with MISA and allowing MISA to approve the eligibility 
of NGOs to receive funding and thus to exclude any organizations that were critical of 
the government (Dunne 2005).  
After the signature of the agreement, MISA and USAID laid the groundwork for 
the implementation of the project. Both, MISA and USAID were to have representatives 
sitting on the ―Steering Committee‖ which, according to project documents, was to be 
chaired by the Minister of Insurance and Social Affairs and to include also 
representatives of the contractors in addition to two representatives from Egyptian NGOs 
as well as Government of Egypt officials. The role of the Steering Committee was to 
approve the eligibility of the NGOs for grants based on the authentication of their 
registration with MISA and validation of the nature of their work as having a 
socioeconomic or developmental focus (Mid-Term Evaluation 2003). Anticipating 
Egyptian government ―intrusion‖, USAID intended to make the steering committee’s role 
an advisory one with regards to project implementation (NGO Service Center 2005). 
However, MISA hindered the committee’s operation which ended up meeting only one 
time till the mid point of the project and its role was largely assumed by MISA up until 
USAID intervened to assert the original format of the roles as set in the grant agreement. 
The ―NGO Advisory Board‖, the second entity besides the Steering committee, was to be 
established to assist the Project Implementing Entity in the implementation of the project. 
The Advisory Board, which was to be composed of representatives of ten NGOs, was 
supposed to provide ―guidance‖ with regards to project implementation to the Project 
Implementing Entity as well as monitor the progress of the project which they have 
managed to do satisfactorily during the span of the project (Mid-Term Evaluation 2003). 
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4.4. NGO Service Center Project’s Evaluation 
 As argued by Imco Brouwer (2000, 42), a thorough assessment of democracy 
assistance projects’ impact should be undertaken on three different levels; the ―Micro‖ 
level which refers to the impact on specific organizations namely the beneficiary 
organizations which received the assistance, the ―Meso‖ level which refers to the 
development of an ―active‖ civil society meaning whether the project somehow had a 
spill over effect on the various organizations which constitute civil society but were not 
direct recipients of the assistance in terms of having an impact on decision making, and 
the ―Macro‖ level which refers to the impact on the political regime in terms of an 
increased level of democratization. The following sections present an evaluation of the 
impact of the NGO Service Center project on the three levels identified by Brouwer.   
4.4.1. Micro Level Evaluation 
Micro level evaluation is mainly concerned with the impact of the project on 
beneficiary NGOs. As Brouwer (2000) has argued that most projects evaluations at this 
level tend to show a positive impact on beneficiary NGOs whether in terms of sustaining 
these organizations or increasing their efficiency, transparency, and accountability as well 
as increasing the skill level of their staff. The data compiled by the contractors for the 
NGO Service Center project as well as external evaluators in addition to the data 
generated through interviews in the context of this thesis seem to provide prima facie 
evidence in support of Brouwer’s argument, however, it still raises some questions about 
the effect of NGO dependence on foreign funding, as anticipated by Edwards and Hulme 
(1998), on their accountability namely leading to a distortion of accountability which can 
be seen in the over bureaucratization of beneficiary NGOs in response to donor 
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requirements as opposed to their neglect of constituency feedback in shaping their 
projects. To put things in perspective, let us consider the contribution the project made to 
beneficiary NGOs in terms of provided grants, training, and technical assistance. By the 
end of the activity, the center had provided 247 grants, half of which funded capacity-
building activities and had no advocacy component. The environmental sector accounted 
for more than third of the provided grants, as illustrated in figure 2, followed by children 
and women’s rights as well as human resources development. The priority given by 
Egyptian NGOs to the environment sector was taken by the center officials as a sign of 
community interest in environmental issues especially in relation to their effect on health 
(NGO Service Center 2005).   
Figure 2: Sectors Selected by Center Grantees for Civic Action 
   
 
 
 
 
 
                        Source: NGO Service Center 2005 
Training covered five main areas advocacy, governance, management, networking and 
gender. Training was provided to 8,301 participants from the 247 grantees of the project. 
Besides providing technical assistance directly to project grantees, the project team 
developed 27 manuals that could be used as a reference by beneficiary NGOs (NGO 
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To assess the NGO Service Center project, USAID and the implementing agency 
set a number of ―performance‖ indicators including: the effect on the organizational 
capabilities of beneficiary organizations, completion of ―designed activity‖ in ―public 
private dialogue‖, number of ―effective actions‖ implemented by CSOs, and the success 
in establishing the ―legacy institution‖ i.e., the Egyptian NGO Support Center (NGO 
Service Center 2005, 67). With regards to the first performance indicator, an 
organizational assessment tool was used to measure the performance of large grant 
recipients only, those who received grants between $100,000 and $500,000. Project 
evaluation indicated that the project results were in line with expectations which were 
based on at least 70% of beneficiary CSOs achieving from 8-10% improvement over 
their baseline scores annually (NGO Service Center 2005). The organizational capacity 
areas that showed improvements included advocacy, general management, internal 
governance and financial management. The area that showed the highest level of 
improvement was that of advocacy, with the scores of the fifty largest grantees increasing 
from 39% to 71% (NGO Service Center 2005). The second performance indicator 
measured small grant beneficiary CSOs’ completion of a planned activity in public 
private dialogue or an improvement of their organizational ability. Overall, the project 
results exceeded expectations which were based on at least 60% of beneficiary CSOs 
completing a planned activity or achieving improvement over their baseline 
organizational capacity scores annually (NGO Service Center 2005). As for the third 
indicator, which was actually added by the implementing agency rather than USAID, 
number of effective actions implemented by CSOs, effective action, as defined in the 
NGO Center Activity context, is ―an action (output or outcome) whose achievement 
69 
 
 
 
significantly enhances the NGO’s capacity or performance in its chosen advocacy 
activity‖ whether it was ―direct‖ i.e., the NGO directly approached decision makers, or 
―indirect‖ i.e., implemented by partners of the beneficiary NGO or highlighted by the 
media, as a result of NGO activity, in a manner that influences the opinion of decision 
makers and constituents (NGO Service Center 2005, 72). Results, as reported by the 
implementing agency, indicate that during the span of the project, beneficiary 
organizations completed a total of 275 effective actions which exceeded the 150 effective 
actions anticipated by the implementing agency. With respect to the last indicator, 
regarding the establishment of the Egyptian NGO Support Center (ENGOSC), even 
though there were some delays during the span of the project in terms of completion of 
the needed steps towards the establishment of this institution, the project succeeded 
before the end at establishing and launching it. All training and technical assistance 
resource materials developed during the span of the project were given to the Egyptian 
NGO Support Center in early 2005 to enable it to continue the provision of training and 
technical assistance to CSOs (NGO Service Center 2005). However, as revealed in an 
interview with an ex USAID official, even though USAID originally intended to endow 
the ENGOSC with $42 million to enable it to play its support role for civil society, 
USAID cancelled its obligation due to a change in its endowments’ policies leaving the 
center to raise its own funds through membership and service fees which limits its reach 
and the range of services it can offer, still, the center is considered an important 
contribution to Egyptian civil society assisting currently 200 NGOs through provision of 
technical assistance and training in addition to providing links to the donor community as 
well as the private sector. Even though the quantitative indicators suggest the success of 
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the project, evaluators acknowledged that these indicators were limited in terms of not 
providing a completely accurate measure of the project’s impact since ―people level‖ data 
was not collected i.e., no assessment was conducted to measure the effect of the grantee’s 
projects on the end beneficiaries, i.e., the people who received grantee NGO services, and 
no investigation was initiated regarding the effect of NGOs in changing people’s 
perceptions on the importance of becoming active in ―managing‖ their community (Mid-
Term Evaluation 2003, 22). Setting aside the performance indicators, one of the most 
celebrated project achievements is the introduction of new concepts such as advocacy and 
networking. Initially, as revealed in one of the interviews in the context of the thesis, the 
notion of advocacy has caused a level of resistance on the part of NGOs which were 
―afraid‖ to be seen as involved in ―anti-government‖ activities. However, by the end of 
the project, most beneficiary NGOs started to accept the idea and conducted a number of 
what was referred to by the project as effective actions. These effective actions included 
holding conferences attended by decision makers to discuss issues of concern chosen by 
the beneficiary NGOs. Even though these conferences provided a forum for interaction 
between NGOs, government representatives and the general public, the impact they had 
on decision makers was mixed at best. External evaluators commented on the fact that the 
outcome of these actions actually depended on the strength of the ministry that the 
beneficiary NGOs sought to influence where in cases of powerful ministries dialogue and 
advocacy went no where (Mid-Term Evaluation 2003). As for the idea of networking, 
sixteen NGO networks were created throughout the project to tackle areas of common 
concern (NGO Service Center 2005). However, as revealed during an interview with an 
ex USAID official, these networks suffered from the dominant role played by the larger 
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―umbrella‖ NGOs in decision making and management of funds which alienated smaller 
network members and resulted in only five of these networks being still active after the 
end of the project.  
Regarding the impact of dependence on foreign funding on beneficiary NGOs, 
within the context of the NGO Service Center project, project evaluators acknowledged 
the fact that most of the project’s beneficiary NGOs were ―entirely dependent‖ on foreign 
funding for their existence and their activities, they even made the point that in the 
absence of such funding, many of the beneficiary NGOs will perish or return to providing 
low quality services (Mid-Term Evaluation 2003, 5). Furthermore, the evaluators have 
found that most beneficiary NGOs ―persist‖ in pursuing foreign donors as their main 
source of funding (Mid-Term Evaluation 2003, 8). This heavy dependence on foreign 
funding has led to what Edwards and Hulme (1998) anticipated mainly the over 
bureaucratization of beneficiary NGOs as well as a shift of accountability from 
constituency to donors. While beneficiary NGOs strived to fulfill USAID requirements, 
they did not seek constituency opinion in their program design nor operations. 
Beneficiary NGOs altered their financial reporting systems to fit the requirements of 
USAID and qualify for project funding and kept minutes of board meetings and made it 
available to the public in response to USAID’s requests to increase transparency. 
However, as reported by evaluators, with respect to the relationship with their 
constituencies, beneficiary NGOs did not involve their constituency in decision making 
whether in terms of setting policies or operations to the point where one of the center’s 
senior officials was reported saying: "we know these projects were not chosen through a 
thorough process of community participation or even consultation‖ (Mid-Term 
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Evaluation 2003, 16). In addition to this, evaluators pointed to the ―condescending‖ 
attitude that beneficiary NGOs maintained vis-à-vis their constituency as well as other 
NGOs (Mid-Term Evaluation 2003, 17).  Evaluators commented on the nature of citizen 
participation, in the case of beneficiary NGOs, which was mostly limited to their staff 
and members and not a larger base of constituents. Interviews revealed that among the 
possible reasons for lack of constituency involvement were: beneficiary NGOs belief that 
they already know what’s good for their community and the perceived effort and cost of 
involving the constituency. The belief that NGOs already know what is needed for their 
constituency actually poses a problem since as evaluators found out most community 
development associations board members came from influential families which made 
them more interested in keeping the ―community balance‖ rather than the 
―empowerment‖ of the community (Mid-Term Evaluation 2003, 14). Evaluators 
mentioned the project efforts to raise awareness through training of the importance of 
electing board members based on efficiency rather than lineage, however, no results were 
reported (Mid-Term Evaluation 2003). As for the perceived effort of involving 
constituency, as revealed by interviews, beneficiary NGOs felt that the level of effort 
needed for conducting meetings and round table discussions with their constituents is 
substantial and therefore opted for focusing on the other two part of the equation in terms 
of engaging in advocacy, the media and decision makers. As for the perceived cost of 
involving constituency, NGOs leaders were apprehensive about integrating new members 
of the community in their work because of the perceived risk they pose if they decide 
they want a more influential role and decide to run for election within the NGO which 
may lead to a replacement of the current decision makers namely those leaders 
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themselves. Interviews also revealed the existence of tensions between NGOs which 
became clear during the project revealing a sort of ―hierarchy‖ that NGOs created for 
themselves, based on whether they have been previous recipients of foreign aid or not 
and the type of donors they interacted with, resulting in a condescending view of those 
who were not recipient of earlier foreign funding and those who received funding from 
Arab donors as opposed to Western donors. 
4.4.2. Meso Level Evaluation 
The meso level evaluation mainly deals with the effect of assistance on the 
development of an ―active‖ civil society in terms of participation in decision making, 
looking beyond the particular effects of assistance on beneficiary NGOs to the effect on 
civil society as a whole. Brouwer (2000, 43) warned against confusing the growth in civil 
society Organizations numbers with the presence of an ―active‖ civil society. Still, as 
argued by Mustapha Al-Sayyid (2000), Egyptian political scientist and civil society 
expert, the abundance of civil society organizations and the variety of services offered by 
them to the multitude of citizens coming from different classes and professions is one of 
the perquisites for the existence of an active civil society. Al-Sayyid (2000) argues that 
the multiplication of civil society organizations over the last decade stands as proof that 
this condition has been met. This is certainly true in the case of the target of civil society 
assistance i.e., NGOs. In 2005, after the end of the center activities, NGOs registered with 
the ministry exceeded 18,600 organizations (Kandil 2006). When this figure is compared 
to the figures presented earlier, 2,600 in 1979 and 14,000 in 2003, it certainly shows a 
multiplication of NGOs. However, as put forward by Brouwer (2000), the increase in 
Civil Society Organizations is not a highly accurate measure of impact at this level but 
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their effect on decision making is a better indicator. Results of the NGO project at the 
micro level show that some beneficiary NGOs in certain cases have managed to affect 
policy making while in other instances they have failed (NGO Service Center 2005). To 
understand the effect of civil society assistance in general and the NGO Service Center 
project in particular at the meso level, it is important to assess whether civil society 
assistance has led to an increase in the participation of civil society in decision making. 
The review of the literature and interviews suggest that there has been an increased level 
of civil society activism, however, this activism has not led to an increased role in 
decision making. In the following section, the campaign opposing law of 1999, which 
was passed prior to the start of the NGO Service Center project, will be used as a 
benchmark against which to measure the impact of the project in comparison to two 
following instances of civil society activism, the campaign opposing the 2002 law and the 
2005 parliamentary elections monitoring. The campaign opposing law of 1999 provided 
insight into the nature of Egyptian civil society, its dynamics as well as the effect of 
foreign assistance on civil society’s role in decision making. As indicated earlier in this 
chapter, NGO efforts to block the 1999 law failed due to the inability of NGOs to present 
a common front in opposition to that law as well as their failure to strengthen their 
position vis-à-vis the government through the mobilization of popular support and their 
vulnerability to attacks by the regime as a result of their dependence on foreign funding. 
After the annulment of the 1999 law for its unconstitutionality and two years into the 
NGO Service Center project, the Egyptian government managed to draft another law in 
2002 equally restrictive to law of 1999 in many aspects.  Even though, the new law was 
as its predecessor opposed by both donors and civil society, it was still passed swiftly by 
75 
 
 
 
the government without taking into account any of the recommendations of NGOs 
(Langhor 2005). The law restricted the activities and funding of NGOs and increased the 
control of the Ministry of Insurance and Social Affairs (MISA) over their operations. 
Article 2 of the 2002 law gave MISA the right to refuse the registration of NGOs and to 
dissolve them (McGann 2008). Article 11 of the law prohibited NGO activities in specific 
areas by stipulating that: 
―Organizations shall not be allowed to conduct any of the following purposes or 
activities: 
1. set up military or Para-military formations or detachments; 
2. Threaten national unity, violate public order or morality or advocate 
discrimination against citizens on grounds of sex, origin, language, religion or 
creed; 
3. Practice any political activity exclusively restricted to political parties under 
the parties law of trade union activity exclusively restricted to trade unions 
under the trade union law; and 
4. Seek profit or practice any profit-oriented activity‖ (as cited in Mid-Term 
Evaluation 2003, 4). 
 
NGOs violating the law by engaging in any of the activities outlined in article 11 face 
severe penalties which include fines and imprisonment that vary in accordance to the 
activity the NGO engaged in, ranging from being fined US$350 and imprisoned for six 
months in case of receipt of funds without MISA approval to being fined US$1,750 and 
imprisoned for a year in case of threatening ―national unity‖ or violating ―public 
morality‖ (Gershman and Allen 2006, 45). The new law increased the government ability 
to monitor and control the internal operations of NGOs, article 25 of the law allows 
MISA representatives to attend and even call for general assembly meetings and article 
34 gives the ministry the right to refuse that certain persons be on the board of members 
of NGOs. The law also imposed harsher regulations on funding than its predecessor 
which allowed NGOs to accept direct funding from donors who were already operating in 
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Egypt (Langhor 2005). Under the new law, article 17 stipulates that NGOs cannot accept 
funds without the ministry’s approval and that until approval the funds will be retained by 
MISA (McGann 2008). The scenario that took place during the opposition to the 1999 
law was repeated with NGO opposition and donor criticism. The United Nations Human 
Rights Commission, the USAID, four political parties and some civil society 
organizations convened a number of conferences and meetings to oppose the new law 
and even called on the president not to ratify it. In departure from the earlier campaign, 
the campaign against law 2002 witnessed an increased level of political activism on the 
part of NGOs which expanded their call to include political reform. However, as was the 
case with the previous campaign, alliances were broken and the advocacy groups that 
took part in the campaign took different paths, some registered under the new law while 
others created protocols with the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs using their 
regional scope to operate without being subjected to the 2002 law. Other groups refused 
to be registered and a few were actually denied registration by MISA (Kandil 2006). 
Thus, while the level of activism increased and its political focus expanded, civil society 
activists have failed in having a role in decision making in terms of stopping the 
application of the law or changing its content. This failure was, similarly to the previous 
campaign against law of 1999, a result of the lack of cooperation among civil society 
organizations and their inability to generate popular support for their demands.   The 
2005 parliamentary elections monitoring also presents another example of the increased 
level of NGO activism in the political sphere. While 52 NGOs managed to get 
government approval to monitor the elections, unfortunately, they were still unable to 
form a common front due to differences between their leaders resulting in the formation 
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of three alliances to monitor the elections. On the positive side, NGOs have managed to 
shed light on the interference of security forces in the elections’ process and the violence 
that erupted in certain areas as well as other illegal practices, however, the fact that the 
NGOs monitoring the elections were divided into a number of alliances resulted in an 
unequal coverage of the different governorates as well as a varied level of reporting 
quality (Kandil 2006). The inability of NGOs to unite even in the presence of a common 
purpose is an indication of the most problematic characteristic of the Egyptian civil 
society namely lack of cohesiveness and cooperation.    
Before discussing in detail the inherent aspects of Egyptian civil society which 
have contributed to the failure to play an effective role in decision making, we need to 
consider the role the United States has played as a donor in the Egyptian case. Some have 
pointed that the failure at this level was not due to a problem with the project itself nor 
USAID approach to the project, but was actually a result of the failure of US officials to 
―back up‖ the project with ―serious, high-level engagement on the Egyptian government 
laws and practices‖ which have limited the extent to which NGOs can have a role in 
advocacy (Dunne 2005, 6). The issue of political reform was not brought up until 2004, 
when Bush raised it after a meeting with Mubarak, before this date high-level talks were 
reserved for prospects of peace in the Middle East (Dunne 2005). It is important to 
acknowledge at this point the effect of the repressive strategies of the Egyptian 
Government on civil society, Amany Kandil (2008, 63), Egyptian civil society expert, 
points out to ―the continued existence of Egypt’s Emergency Law‖ and ―the application 
of the penal code to infringements of the Association Law‖ as some of the reasons for the 
weakness of Egyptian civil society.  Al-Sayyid (1995, 271) also includes the presence of 
78 
 
 
 
a clear boundary for the ―arbitrary‖ nature of state control over civil society in a set of 
three criteria that he considers a prerequisite to the existence of a ―vibrant‖ civil society 
i.e., a civil society that can actually have an impact on decision making. This is clearly 
not present in the Egyptian case where the use of extralegal measures is rampant and 
where there are ample cases of arbitrary arrests and torture of civil society activists 
(McGann 2008). Furthermore, the Emergency Law, which has been effective sine the 
1967 Arab-Israeli war, provides a legal cover for the government’s arbitrary prosecution 
of activists. In addition to this, the government has even managed to include in the 
constitution through a referendum in 2007 certain elements of the Emergency Law 
(Freedom House 2008). The amendments, which were presented as a crucial for 
counterterrorism efforts, pose severe limitations on freedom of expression. Article 179 
gives the police the ability to scrutinize private communications and subjugate private 
citizens to military court rulings. Article 88 ended election monitoring by the judiciary 
which was put in place by the Supreme Constitutional Court ruling in 2000 (Exum and 
Snyder 2007). Adding to this, the ambiguity of law 84 of 2002 itself, with its reference to 
―threatening national unity‖ and ―violations of public order or morality‖, allows the 
government to have ―great leverage‖ and provides an additional legal basis for its 
arbitrariness vis-à-vis NGOs since these ―broad terms‖ can be defined by the government 
not only to hinder NGO activity but also to dissolve NGOs at will (Gershman and Allen 
2006, 42).  
While the Egyptian government regulations and strategies have undermined the 
ability of civil society to play an effective role in decision making, a multitude of other 
elements have actually contributed to this failure, as put forward in the hypothesis, 
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including the design of the civil society assistance projects in general and the NGO 
service center in particular and the inherent characteristics of the targeted civil society 
organizations. The NGO Service Center project, as in the case of other USAID civil 
society assistance projects, allowed the Egyptian government to play a major role in the 
project which limited the type of organizations that could be reached by the project to 
those registered with MISA. In addition to that, the project targeted a limited sector of 
Egyptian civil society namely NGOs mostly Community Development Associations 
(CDAs) in addition to a limited number of advocacy NGOs in the field of women and 
children rights. Even Project evaluators acknowledged the weakness of the CSOs’ 
targeted and its subsequent limitation on project impact at the micro level (Mid-Term 
Evaluation 2003, 4). The project adopted a rather myopic view of civil society excluding 
a variety of actors which may have a larger popular support base which would have 
enabled them to garner support for their advocacy activities (Al-Sayyid 2000). The focus 
on NGOs and especially CDAs, which are more concerned with service provision and are 
in many instances an extension of the state apparatus, puts a serious limitation on what 
the project can achieve especially when these organizations have serious structural 
problems whether in terms of problems of internal democracy and lack of cooperation 
between different organizations as well as lack of constituency involvement as seen at the 
micro level. This brings us to the central contention of the hypothesis namely the effect of 
the nature of Egyptian NGOs as well as their relationship with constituencies and internal 
dynamics governing the relations between NGOs from different sectors on their ability to 
play an active role in terms of participating in decision making. Kandil (2008, 63) points 
out to the weakening effect of   civil society organizations’ ―lack of good internal 
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governance practices‖. Even though, the NGO Service Center project has attempted to 
improve the internal operation of beneficiary NGOs and increase the effectiveness of 
their internal bodies as well as increase the transparency and accountability of beneficiary 
NGOs, evaluators acknowledged the fact that training on internal governance did not 
result in democratization of NGOs in terms of changing the behavior of NGO leaders 
(Mid-Term Evaluation 2003).  Furthermore, Maha Abdelrahman (2004), who conducted 
a study with a sample of 60 Egyptian NGOs, reveals that in reality Egyptian NGOs do 
not fit the idealistic image of agents of change and democracy. The study found that 
Egyptian NGOs face an internal democracy crisis as well as a hostile environment that 
does not encourage cooperation and coordination to reach a common goal. With respect 
to the internal bodies of Egyptian NGOs, most of them proved to be inactive and 
ineffective with a highly centralized decision making process. In most cases, the general 
assembly, which in theory holds the board of directors accountable, is actually an 
―honorary‖ board that seldom meets and has no actual role in decision making 
(Abdelrahman 2004, 153).  Additionally, most of the members of the general assembly of 
the studied NGOs came from exactly the same class and professional background as the 
board of directors not from the constituencies these NGOs seek to serve. With respect to 
board of directors, their members were mostly from influential families or were civil 
servants either currently or previously employed by the Ministry of Insurance and Social 
Affairs, all of them coming from the middle classes and having a higher level of 
education. The employees of NGOs fall under two categories: those made available 
through the ministry and those hired by the NGOs. While NGOs face difficulty in 
retaining their hired employees because of the low salaries they provide, they also face a 
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difficulty satisfying ministry employees seconded to them since these employees are not 
granted the additional incentives other ministry employees at headquarters get so they 
become increasingly dissatisfied with their work in NGOs. Abdelrahman (2004) points to 
the absence of volunteers who in theory represent the essence and form the backbone of 
NGOs. She also points to the recent trend of professional volunteerism, as a result of 
donor funding, where certain volunteers, who are referred to sometimes as ―community 
leaders‖, became paid agents being employed full time in certain instances (Abdelrahman 
2004, 170). Abdelrahman’s findings, regarding the lack of internal democracy in NGOs, 
were replicated in a 2007 study, combining a survey with a sample of 120 NGOs and 
focus groups with NGO members, conducted by the Arab Network for NGOs assessing 
NGOs’ level of internal governance. The study revealed that mostly the board of directors 
was responsible alone for making decisions about all internal matters; the findings 
indicated that for almost half of the NGOs in the sample the board of directors is 
responsible for all internal decisions and only in less than a quarter of the sample, the 
general assembly was ―consulted‖ (Kandil 2008, 81). The survey also revealed that in 
almost half the cases, the board of directors was headed by the same person for ten years 
or more. With regards to constituency, only 15% of the sample mentioned that they 
conduct needs assessment and opinion polls. The shortage of volunteers was also brought 
up; almost three quarter of the NGOs in the sample commented on their inability to 
attract volunteers. In the focus groups, NGO members recognized the internal problems 
their organizations were suffering from namely ―the absence of a culture of democracy, 
domination of the chairman of the board of directors, and marginalization of the general 
assembly‖ (Kandil 2008, 82).  
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Both Al-Sayyid (1995) and Kandil (2006) stress the importance of the ability of 
civil society to cooperate, which is essential for expanding their resource base and their 
autonomy, in order to increase their ability to affect decision makers. Taking again the 
case of the NGO Service Center project, the project has tried to tackle this problem by 
providing forums for networking and encouraging NGO cooperation, however, as 
indicated earlier in the micro level results, the networks formed suffered from the 
hegemony of the bigger NGOs and most of them were dissolved after the end of the 
project. Foreign funding has also proved to be a source of conflict at the micro level 
between beneficiary NGOs. At the meso level, foreign funding has also intensified the 
already existing ―polarization‖ of Egyptian civil society with the secularists on one side 
and the Islamists on the other as revealed by Abdelrahman’s study (2004, 186). The two 
camps’ differing ideologies and views of democracy and civil society presented already a 
reason for conflict and undermined the cohesion of civil society. The Islamic camp view 
of democracy and civil society as ―a part of a western plot‖ to extend their influence in 
the Muslim world shaped their response to secular and especially advocacy groups, 
which are recipients of foreign funding, calling for democracy which led them to dismiss 
these groups as ―mouthpieces‖ for the west (Abdelrahman 2004, 186-7). In addition to 
the perception of advocacy NGOs as ―puppets‖ in western hands, they are also accused 
by Islamists of being ―allies‖ of the government in their support for western influence; 
Abdelrahman (2004,188) quotes a member of an Islamic NGO saying that: 
 ―[Advocacy NGOs] are always pretending to be fighting against imperialism and 
the government. In reality, however, they are no better than the corrupt 
government; they are also funded by America and other Western countries, and 
they receive funding in return for spreading American culture and ideas among 
Egyptians in the name of charity and goodwill‖.  
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Advocacy groups are also perceived to be more dependent on the West than the 
government which still has other resources at its disposal and can preserve a degree of 
autonomy while advocacy groups will perish without donor financial support. With this 
negative view of advocacy NGO, cooperation between them and Islamist NGOs seem to 
be out of the question. Even though, Islamist NGOs, in Abdelrahman’s study (2004), 
expressed their willingness to cooperate with Community Development Associations and 
Coptic NGOs, there were no prior initiatives of cooperation or any steps taken in that 
direction. On the other side, Advocacy groups, which are considered to be the most vocal 
champion of democracy in Egyptian civil society and are the most ―prosecuted‖ by the 
government, are critical of donors’ conceptualization of democracy as limited to elections 
and of civil society as excluding the ―informal‖ sector which encompasses the family and 
other semi organized groups (Abdelrahman 2004, 191). The study showed that advocacy 
groups also held negative opinions of most other NGOs. While they think of Community 
Development Associations as state tools who have no role in democratization, they view 
all Islamist organizations as unworthy of being a partner even in dialogues let alone 
cooperation in activity areas. Even though advocacy groups seem to respect the 
professionalism of Coptic organizations, they see them as ―contradicting the secular 
nature of civil society‖ (Abdelrahman 2004, 192). 
Lost between the two opposing camps, Community Development Associations (CDAs) 
seem to share the Islamist group distrust of democracy and civil society which they fear 
can open the door to unrest. They also share the Islamist group negative opinions of 
advocacy groups especially with the rising criticism they get from advocacy groups for 
their dependence on state funding while the latter are seen as not only dependent on 
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external funding, foreign donors in their case, but also intellectually dependant on the 
ideologies provided by the West (Abdelrahman 2004). In addition, CDAs accuse 
advocacy groups of being collaborators with the government since receipt of foreign 
funding is conditioned on being registered with MISA and subject to its approval as well 
as using the same imported ―jargon‖ that the government uses to assert its legitimacy 
(Abdelrahman 2004, 194). Ironically, CDAs expressed their willingness to cooperate 
with Islamist NGOs but were hesitant about cooperation with Coptic ones in fear of 
loosing their ―religious neutrality‖ (Abdelrahman 2004, 194). Coptic NGOs, in the 
sample, seemed to be quite supportive of the ideas of democracy and civil society. They 
were also the only NGO type to express their ―unconditional willingness‖ to work with 
all other types of NGOs (Abdelrahman 2004, 194). This is mainly an illustration of the 
positive view they have of most other NGOs. They regarded advocacy groups’ 
professionalism with admiration, viewed the limitations of CDAs in terms of redundancy 
of services as fixable, and considered Islamist NGOs highly committed to serving their 
communities. However, they acknowledged the constraints placed on them by their 
constituencies with regards to working with Islamist NGOs because their feeling that 
services should be limited to Copts especially since most of Coptic NGOs funding comes 
from Coptic sources (Abdelrahman 2004). Thus, the different segments of civil society 
hold mostly negative views of each other and as a result they are unwilling to cooperate 
with each other with the exception of those groups which are small and marginalized. 
This unwillingness to cooperate restricts Egyptian civil society ability, as argued by Al-
Sayyid (1995) and Kandil (2006), to expand their resource base and their autonomy 
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which compromises their ability to affect decision makers whether in areas that relate to 
their existence such as the associations’ law or in areas affecting their constituencies.   
The third and most problematic aspect of Egyptian civil society and the most 
detrimental in terms of the ability to influence decision makers is its lack of constituency 
involvement. Even in the case of the NGO Service Center project which has tried to 
stress the importance of involving constituencies in NGO decision making, evaluators 
acknowledged the fact that beneficiary NGOs did not involve their constituencies in 
choice of implemented projects, thus not necessarily meeting the priority areas or needs 
of their communities as perceived by their constituencies (Mid-Term Evaluation 2003). 
Furthermore, the study conducted by Abdelrahman (2004) revealed that the lack of 
citizen participation in Egyptian NGO decision making is a wide spread problem. The 
study indicated that NGOs were not dealing with their constituents as ―equals‖, NGOs 
held the view that they know what’s best for their constituencies and that they are better 
equipped to decide what’s good for their communities (Abdelrahman 2004, 172). Thus, 
Egyptian NGOs actually seem to be perpetuating the relationship established by the 
government towards the people, being on the receiving end with no say in what services 
they need. The result is that people respond the same way they respond to government, 
they accept the provided services but do not envision a role for themselves in the shaping 
or sustainability of these services. Abdelrahman (2004) points to the irony of NGOs, 
supposedly ―people’s organizations‖, not involving their communities in the choice of 
board members which she argues makes the Egyptian government look more 
―participatory‖ and ―empowering‖ than NGOs (Abdelrahman 2004, 174). The only two 
areas where the study found NGOs involving their constituency were fundraising and 
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actual project implementation, thus, limiting the interpretation of ―empowerment‖ to 
letting people shoulder their part of ―responsibilities‖ while providing them with no 
―rights‖ in terms of having a say in the choice of projects and services provided to them 
(Abdelrahman 2004, 175). To back these results, Abdelrahman (2004) also conducted a 
research in the communities served by the studied NGOs and asserted the fact that the 
implemented projects by these NGOs did not correspond to what their communities 
believe to be a priority. Thus, this raises the issue that even when NGOs manage to 
influence decision making in certain instances, they still are not representing their 
constituency. This problem is further acerbated in the case of advocacy groups which 
depend in their survival on their ability to attract funding from donors rather than their 
ability to mobilize their own constituency, making them actually ―isolated‖ from their 
constituency which can be seen as a ―paradoxical consequence‖ of civil society assistance 
(Abdelrahman 2004, 302). The fact is that even in the case of the NGO Service Center, 
evaluators pointed to the fact that the project did not lead to increased citizen 
participation in NGO decision making in terms of choice of services to be delivered to 
them (Mid-Term Evaluation 2003). Therefore, it seems that it is quite unrealistic to 
expect that Egyptian civil society will actually have a role in decision making when it 
faces a hostile legal and political environment in addition to inherent structural problems 
such as its internal democracy problem, lack of constituency involvement, and lack of 
cooperation within the sector which all combine to weaken the autonomy of the various 
civil society organizations and subsequently the role they can play in Egyptian political 
life. 
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4.4.3. Macro Level Evaluation 
The macro level evaluation brings us to the effect of assistance on the regime or 
in other terms whether assistance has helped in fostering democratization. Before 
evaluating civil society assistance on the macro level, it is important to put things in 
perspective with regards to its instrumentality in bringing about democratization. First, 
we need to acknowledge, as pointed out by Carothers and Ottoway (2000b, 303), that 
even though civil society can play an important role in increasing the ―pluralism‖ of a 
political system, it still represents only one of a multitude of elements that combined can 
assist in bringing about democracy. Second, as argued by Hawthorne (2005), we need to 
take into consideration that civil society assistance needs to be preceded by 
socioeconomic and political changes that allows the movement of society towards 
democratization. Having acknowledged the concerns about evaluating the effect of civil 
society assistance in general on the macro level, let us point to what many commentators 
have said about the effect of democracy assistance in general and civil society assistance 
in particular on the Egyptian political system. Jon Altman
12
, director of the Middle East 
program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, so aptly described the futile 
attempts to foster democratization in Egypt through the use of democracy assistance 
stating in a statement before the congress that ―tens of millions of dollars spent on de-
concentration of political power, democratization, and capacity building has vanished 
into the sands‖ and that the Egyptian government has managed to ―strengthen nationalist 
sentiments‖ to counter American democracy promotion efforts and dismiss internal 
voices calling for reform as ―foreign agents‖ while posing itself as ―defending the nation 
                                                 
12
 This remark is an excerpt of Jon Alterman’s statement delivered before the House International 
Committee on the 21
st
 of June as a ―Review of U.S. Assistance Programs to Egypt‖. The whole statement is 
available from www.csis.org 
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against foreign intrigue‖. As for the effect of civil society assistance in particular, 
Hawthorne (2005, 101) argues that civil society assistance ―fell short in contributing to 
the process of democratization‖ in as far not being able to ―generate popular demand for 
democracy‖ nor to change the Egyptian government’s harsh position vis-à-vis civic 
activism nor to lead to political change.  
Many indicators have been developed and used to measure the level of 
democratization of countries, however, the two most widely used are the polity IV and 
freedom house indexes which were used by Steven Finkel, Perez-Linan and Seligson in 
their cross-national quantitative studies, described in chapter 2 of this thesis, in which 
they assessed the impact of democracy assistance on democratization. The ―polity score‖, 
which combines the democratic and autocratic traits of governments into a single score, 
places political regimes on a continuum using a 21-point scale ranging from -10 
described as ―consolidated autocracy‖ to +10 described as ―consolidated democracy‖. 
The polity IV index starts with the computation of an autocracy and democracy score for 
a country and then subtracts the democracy score out of the autocracy to reach a single 
score, the polity score (Polity 2009). On the other hand, the freedom house index uses the 
combination of ―civil liberties‖ and ―political rights‖ to indicate the level of freedom of a 
specific country. A seven point scale, from 1 to 7, is used for both civil liberties and 
political rights where 1 represents the highest level of freedom  while 7 represents the 
lowest, then both figures are combined to classify a country as ―Free, Partly Free, or Not 
Free‖ (Freedom House Methodology 2009). To assess the NGO Service Center impact on 
the macro level, a review of both the polity IV and freedom house indexes’ scores before 
and after the project will be presented in the following section. With regards to polity 
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score, as the following table shows, while Egypt has maintained a score of -6, classified 
as ―autocracy‖ mostly throughout the NGO Service Center project, this changed starting 
2005 to a score of -3 which is classified as ―anocracy‖, describing mainly a regime that 
combines certain traits of autocracy and democracy adding up to a score that falls within 
the range of +5 to -5 (Polity IV 2009).  
Table 3: Egypt’s Polity Scores (1999-2007)13 
 Democracy Autocracy Polity IV Score 
1999 0 6 - 6 
2000 0 6 - 6 
2001 0 6 - 6 
2002 0 6 - 6 
2003 0 6 - 6 
2004 0 6 - 6 
2005 1 4 -3 
2006 1 4 -3 
2007 1 4 -3 
Source: Center for Systemic Peace 2009 
Since the polity score focuses on the traits of political regimes, the improvement in 
Egypt’s polity score was mainly a reflection of the change in presidential elections rules 
in 2005, which allowed other party candidates to run beside Mubarak, which affected one 
of the components of the polity score namely political competition resulting in the change 
in Egypt’s polity score (Polity IV Country Report 2007).  The freedom house scores 
which focus on political rights and civil liberties give a slightly different view. As 
illustrated in the following table, Egypt has been classified as ―not free‖ before the start 
                                                 
13
 This is part of a larger data set that includes data on 162 countries. The data for Egypt covers from 1922 
to 2007 and can be downloaded from http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/p4v2007.xls 
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of the NGO Service Center Project and after. The political rights score remained constant 
prior to, during and after the end of the project at a score of 6 which indicates a ―minimal 
manifestation of political rights, such as some degree of representation or autonomy for 
minorities‖. However, the civil liberties score fluctuated slightly in 2000 at start of 
project from 5, which indicates medium levels of ―censorship‖ and ―prevention of free 
association‖, to remain for the duration of the project at a score 6, which indicates 
―severely restricted rights of expression and association‖, to revert finally at the end of 
the project and onwards to a score of 5 which is its pre-project level (Freedom House 
2009). 
Table 4: Egypt’s Freedom House Scores (1999-2008) 
 Political Rights Civil Liberties Status 
1999 6 5 Not Free 
2000 6 6 Not Free 
2001 6 6 Not Free 
2002 6 6 Not Free 
2003 6 6 Not Free 
2004 6 6 Not Free 
2005 6 5 Not Free 
2006 6 5 Not Free 
2007 6 5 Not Free 
2008 6 5 Not Free 
Source: Freedom House 2009 
Even though the image presented by freedom house of Egyptian democratization seems 
to be stagnant from 2005, freedom house country reports made allusions to the retreat of 
reforms after the 2005 elections with the postponement of municipal elections in 2006, 
the extension of the emergency law and the harsh policies vis-à-vis any source of 
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opposition to the regime (Freedom in the World 2007). Furthermore, in 2008, freedom 
house assigned to Egypt a ―downward trend arrow‖ as a result of the amendments to the 
constitution which integrated elements of the emergency law in the Egyptian constitution 
and limited the judicial monitoring of elections (Freedom in the World 2008). 
The failure to civil society assistance to have an impact on the macro level is not 
surprising given that it has already failed to have an impact on the meso level i.e., the 
failure to make civil society more involved in decision making which resulted from the 
variety of reasons presented whether relating to political and legal environment, project 
design and characteristics of Egyptian civil society. Kandil (2006) points out to the 
characteristics of Egyptian civil society hindering its ability to play a role in political 
reform, which have already led to a failure at the meso level, including lack of internal 
democracy, low level of cooperation between civil society organizations and lack of 
constituency involvement. In addition to this, Kandil (2006) makes a distinction between 
the ability to take part in decision making and the pursuit of democracy on the part of 
civil society. This is especially pertinent in the case of the one segment of civil society 
which seems to have had an input in the decision making process of the government i.e., 
business associations. Both Kandil (2006) and Al-Sayyid, in an interview conducted in 
the context of this thesis, indicated that business associations and think tanks focused on 
economic issues have managed to influence decision makers successfully in the 
economic sphere. However, as argued by Kandil (2006), the problem is that this segment 
of civil society is not in active pursuit of political reform or democracy, but is actually 
seeking further integration with the government through becoming members in the ruling 
party and being represented in the various councils. Thus, even if there was a move 
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towards democratization, as seen in the change in presidential elections rules, it would 
not be logical to ascribe such a move to civil society assistance especially one that was 
directed solely to NGOs. The amended rules for the presidential elections could actually 
be attributed to the short-lived US push for democratization in Egypt from 2003 to 2005 
as well as to some extent the pressure from a variety of actors including the Muslim 
Brotherhood and even some state elements, however, with the success of the Muslim 
Brotherhood in the parliamentary elections, the United States revised its position and 
started adopting a mellower approach towards Egyptian political reform. Furthermore, 
the Egyptian government response mainly to the pressure applied by the US, culminating 
in the amendment of the constitution to allow direct election of the president eventually 
leading to the 2005 presidential and parliamentary elections, was limited in terms of 
producing overreaching and everlasting results. After the success of the Muslim 
Brotherhood in the parliamentary elections, the Egyptian government ―cracked down‖ on 
members of the Brotherhood and made amendments to the constitution that banned the 
formation of parties with religious nature while limiting the ability of independents to run 
for elections which meant limiting the access of the Muslim Brotherhood to power. In 
addition to this, the Egyptian government incorporated many aspects of the much 
criticized emergency law in the constitution giving the executive sector considerable 
latitude in prosecuting individuals in military courts to the detriment of political and 
social liberty (Dunne, Hamzawy, and Nathan J. Brown 2007).    
With the existence of democratic institutions and the failure to ―consolidate‖ as 
presented in the sequencing paradigm, or the ―third wave‖ of democratization to take 
hold as described by Huntington, various new labels have been used to qualify the 
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Egyptian system. Some have categorized the Egyptian system as falling under 
―liberalized autocracies‖ which was defined as ―liberal in the sense that their leaders not 
only tolerate but promote a measure of openness in civil society, in the press and even in 
the electoral system of their country …. But they are autocratic in that their rulers always 
retain the upper hand. They control the security establishment, dominate the media, and 
dole out economic rewards to favorite clients‖ (Brumberg 2005, 16). Others, basically 
using similar definitions which maintain the notion of the supremacy of the executive and 
―limited‖ civil liberties, have labeled the Egyptian system ―semi-authoritarian‖ (Ottoway 
2005, 125). A third label, coined by Gershman
14
 and Allen, earned by the Egyptian 
system was that of a ―hybrid regime‖ which has essentially managed to ―retain certain 
formally democratic procedures, including relatively free (if not fair) elections, and 
permit civil society organizations to function and receive foreign assistance. But the 
underlying political realities are manipulated elections, a weak parliament, an 
overweening executive branch, state-controlled media, rampant corruption, and no 
recourse to an independent judiciary‖ (Gershman and Allen 2006, 37). 
                                                 
14
 Carl Gershman is the president of the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), a private nonprofit 
organization created in 1983 to promote democracy. He has also helped in establishing the quarterly 
Journal of Democracy, International Forum for Democratic Studies, and the Reagan-Fascell Democracy 
Fellows Program.   
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CHAPTER FIVE  
CONCLUSION 
In the previous chapter, a thorough examination of the impact of the USAID’s 
NGO Service Center project on the micro, meso, and macro levels was conducted. 
Findings at the micro level showed a positive impact on beneficiary organizations in 
terms of improved organizational and advocacy skills. Findings at the meso level showed 
an increased level of NGO presence in the political sphere, however, this activism was 
not translated to an involvement in shaping political decision making. As proposed by the 
literature and anticipated within the framework of this thesis, macro level results showed 
a failure to promote democracy.  While most of the literature suggests that the failure of 
Democracy Assistance to foster democratization in Egypt was mainly attributed to the 
restrictions imposed by the Egyptian regime, this thesis aimed to explore whether other 
factors have contributed to this failure especially in the case of civil society assistance 
using the NGO Service Center project as a case study.  
The data collected in the context of this thesis provides substantial support to the 
arguments presented in the hypothesis namely that both the design of Democracy 
Assistance projects as well as the nature of the civil society organizations supported by 
these projects have contributed to the failure of Democracy Assistance to foster 
democratization in the Egyptian Context. The USAID’s myopic view of civil society, 
which is equated to NGOs, has limited the effects democracy assistance especially with 
the exclusion of other civil society elements which are more concerned with the 
promotion of democracy. The fact that the design of USAID projects allows the Egyptian 
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government to select and approve the beneficiary organizations limited further the nature 
of the NGOs that could be reached by the project to those approved by the Ministry of 
Social Affairs which meant the exclusion of NGOs which are critical of the government 
namely Human Rights and Prodemocracy NGOs. 
The focus on a single segment of civil society has also proven detrimental due to 
the nature of Egyptian NGOs. Both the specific data regarding the organizations targeted 
by the NGO Service Center project and the literature show that Egyptian NGOs are 
plagued by a variety of problems from lack of internal democracy to low interest in 
constituency involvement in decision making which contributed to the weakness of these 
organizations. The data compiled in the context of the thesis also show a lack of 
cooperation between Egyptian NGOs which affected negatively their ability to influence 
decision makers in several instances and which will continue to hinder their potential to 
take an active part in Egyptian political life. Even at the micro level, most networks 
formed within the project suffered from hegemony of larger member organizations and 
failed to persist after the end of the project. As suggested in the hypothesis, NGOs’ 
dependence on foreign funding has caused a shift in NGO accountability from 
constituency to donors. In the context of the project, beneficiary NGOs adapted their 
internal processes and accounting procedures according to USAID requirements while 
neglecting constituency feedback in their project design and internal operation. NGOs’ 
dependence on foreign funding has also made them vulnerable to government attacks on 
their legitimacy. These attacks coupled with the initially low level of popular support 
characterizing beneficiary NGOs raises serious doubts as to their ability to generate 
popular support for their projects let alone for the pursuit of democracy.   
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